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Foreword
The welcome flexibilities introduced in the 2014 Budget are the 
biggest changes to the retirement income market for decades. 
Quite rightly, a significant amount of attention has been given to 
the delivery and content of the free, impartial guidance which will 
be provided to consumers at retirement. But just as important 
in this debate is ensuring that the retirement income products 
ofered to consumers are suitable and that they ofer value for 
money.
These reforms are likely to lead to a significant decline in 
the sale of annuities. This raises important questions about the 
features and risks of the alternative products which currently 
exist and those which will be developed in the run-up to April 
2015. To contribute to this debate, Which? commissioned Debbie 
Harrison and David Blake of the Pensions Institute to evaluate the 
alternative products which are currently available and those which 
could be developed. 
Their report finds that, overwhelmingly, the current system 
funnels consumers towards the purchase of annuities, regardless 
of whether or not they are appropriate or ofer good value. The 
regulatory regime has failed to take into account the significant 
pressure on consumers at a stressful time in their lives and the fact 
that, for most, there has been only one chance to make the right 
decision.  
Policy and regulation in the retirement income phase has, 
arguably, been premised on the idea that consumers will make 
better decisions with more information; that they will use this 
information to select the option they know they prefer, and 
that they can accurately estimate future costs, needs and 
circumstances. We know from the behavioural sciences that this is 
simply not the case.   
In the past, this has led to a lack of efective competition 
and too many consumers receiving a poor deal. For example, 
insurance companies selling an annuity 15 per cent of the best 
market rate efectively wipes out nine years of a consumer’s 
hard earned pension contributions at a stroke. Reforms need to 
be made to avoid the emerging market in alternative retirement 
income products becoming as dysfunctional as the annuity 
market. Innovation in this area must be based on the needs 
of consumers.  As this report highlights, many of the current 
alternatives to annuities do not meet the needs of the mass 
market of consumers. 
For many consumers, leaving their pension invested and 
drawing an income from it will become the norm, rather than the 
exception. These products must be transformed from a niche 
strategy for the wealthy, due to the potentially high initial and 
ongoing costs and investment and longevity risks, into a mass 
market product accessible to most, if not all, consumers.
It is essential that these flexible pension income products 
are transparent, with risks and benefits highlighted clearly and 
that they have reasonable charges.  The human tendency to do 
nothing in the face of complexity means that consumers will need 
Peter Vicary-Smith Group Chief Executive, Which?
help when making these decisions. This help must take into 
account the likelihood that they will underestimate their own 
life expectancy and care costs, and cover factors including how 
much they might want to draw out of their pension each year, 
their tax position and attitude to risk.
Equally, how information and options are framed will have 
a significant impact on consumer decision making; therefore, 
regulatory oversight of the presentation of information will be 
critical, as will strict enforcement on how fees, risks and rates are 
communicated to individuals. The reforms could also act as a 
honeypot for those peddling unregulated investments and all 
stakeholders need to do more to help consumers avoid such 
pitfalls. 
If there is one thing we have learnt from auto-enrolment, it 
is that a default option is a powerful tool and that, in the face 
of complexity, many consumers will end up taking the default 
retirement income product ofered by their scheme. So, default 
investment strategies need to be reviewed urgently to reflect the 
fact that more consumers will remain invested after retirement. 
Most importantly it is vital that there is strong governance in 
place to ensure that those running schemes and taking decisions 
about retirement income products have strong duties to act in 
the best interests of consumers.
In the run-up to the new reforms, the FCA should revise its 
rules around the sale of retirement income products and must 
not hesitate to use its product intervention powers to prevent 
unsuitable products from being sold to consumers.
Even with the newly-introduced flexibilities, annuities will 
remain an important part of retirement income provision for 
some consumers, albeit it’s likely that they will be bought at 
a much later age – perhaps 75 to 80. So it remains vital that 
reforms to this market are accelerated so that consumers receive 
the right type of annuity and the best rate possible, bought at the 
right time for them.
Automatic enrolment has got of to a good start, with the 
first increase in participation in workplace pension savings for 8 
years. Ensuring that consumers get a good deal at retirement 
when turning their hard-earned contributions into an income 
stream must now be a central focus for Government, industry 
and regulators.
We hope that the ideas in this report - including the bold 
idea of exploring how to extend the ‘institutionalised’ benefits of 
auto-enrolment into the retirement income phase - will make a 
significant contribution to the debate.
Peter Vicary-Smith
Group Chief Executive, Which?
This a Which? report prepared by Debbie Harrison and David Blake of the  
Pensions Institute, drawing on their expertise and research. The main research 
took place between December 2013 and April 2014, but the insights into the market 
represent a continuation of the analysis in previous Pensions Institute reports that 
investigate the decumulation market and DC workplace schemes. We are also 
grateful for the insights of the organisations interviewed for this report. These are 
listed in the acknowledgments.
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Auto-enrolment has brought great benefits to the DC 
pensions market in the UK. Coupled with the introduction of 
large, multi-employer trust based schemes, it has efectively 
institutionalised the savings ‘accumulation’ phase of workplace 
DC pensions. This institutionalised approach has brought with it 
improved governance and communications, carefully designed 
investment strategies and lower charges - in other words, value 
for money.
But these value-driving benefits currently end at the point 
of retirement when scheme members, and individuals with 
personal pension plans, convert their pension savings into 
a retirement income. Currently, many consumers are left to 
sort out their own retirement income choices; they enter the 
opaque, high-cost and poor-value market of retail annuities and 
retail drawdown products with little support.
The 2014 Budget proposes flexibility but, at the same time, 
even more complexity for consumers. The government has 
promised free, impartial guidance, but it will still be a huge 
challenge for all parties to ensure that real benefits flow from 
the new flexibility that has been introduced and that the same 
problems do not simply shift from the retail annuity market, with 
its flawed pricing and distribution, to the retail drawdown market, 
which is served largely by the same providers and distributors 
and which, as a result, sufers from the same potential flaws. The 
risks of a future drawdown mis-selling scandal should not be 
underestimated. 
We have four central points for the government and the 
regulators to consider:
  First, while introducing flexibility, the new DC retirement 
income market presents a number of potential pitfalls for 
consumers, who will need to make a series of complex decisions 
which require personalised advice. The choices they make will 
be significantly influenced by how the options are presented 
and explained. Some DC customers will be attracted to single-
asset investment strategies, such as buy-to-let, and many will 
be vulnerable to firms that sell unregulated investments that 
appear to ofer attractive yields. 
Executive summary
1.  At present, the immediate purchase of the Life Time 
Annuity (LTA) is driven by pressure applied by those 
responsible for DC scheme governance. There are vested 
interests on the annuity sell-side (insurance companies) and 
also conflicts of interest on the part of trustees of DC schemes. 
Insurers that sell both DC pensions and annuities have a vested 
interest in retaining customers’ pension pots at retirement and 
also by capturing other customers via the LTA open market 
option. Trustees of DC schemes arguably are conflicted because 
they discharge all responsibility to members at the point of the 
annuity purchase. In some cases, the trustees and the provider 
are one and the same, which creates further conflicts.
2. These conflicts of interest and vested interests are 
compounded by a regulatory system that to date has 
favoured LTAs, due to the guarantees that they ofer, and 
which does not appear to understand the risks associated 
with this product. Risks include the absence of inflation 
protection, historically low annuity rates due to quantitative 
easing, and the impact of the increased use of individual 
underwriting techniques on the annuity risk pool, among other 
factors.  The current system gives DC customers only one shot 
at making the right decision. It takes little or no account of the 
pressure on DC customers, at a very dificult and stressful time 
in their lives, to make a complex and, in the case of the LTA, an 
irreversible decumulation decision for which there is no learning 
curve. 
3. Following the 2014 Budget, income drawdown and 
non-pensions investment products increasingly will be 
the norm for DC customers who do not qualify for trivial 
commutation. Therefore many DC customers will bear 
investment and longevity risks into retirement. They might also 
be tempted to take inappropriate risks in a bid to secure a higher 
return – for example by investing in a single asset class via 
buy-to-let – and be preyed upon by unscrupulous firms that sell 
wholly unsuitable unregulated investment products. 
4. Current alternatives to lifetime annuities do not meet 
the needs of the mass market, due to the costs and 
investment risks. Moreover, the advice market is ill-adapted 
to the new regime, as few firms ofer full regulated advice to 
customers who have DC pots worth less than £50,000 to 
100,000 and no additional investible assets. If this scenario does 
not change, then the biggest beneficiaries of DC decumulation 
flexibility will be the manufacturers and distributers of products 
– the insurance companies, investment managers and advisers – 
that will profit from the high charges and sales commissions, but 
bear none of the risks. 
Key findings
5. At the heart of the DC decumulation challenge is a 
disconnection between the trend towards an institutional 
model for governance for accumulation in multi-trust, 
multi-employer auto-enrolment schemes, which includes 
carefully-designed investment strategies and lower 
charges, and the cost and risks associated with retail 
decumulation products all of which are borne by the 
individual.
6. Providing free face-to-face impartial guidance for 
more than 400,000 people each year – which is what the 
government has promised – will be a massive challenge 
that requires sustainable funding. Under the new regime the 
choices will be far more complex, for example, DC customers 
who want to draw a regular income will need to consider a 
complex range of factors, including the impact on income tax, 
investment risk, and longevity risk. They will need personalised 
help to determine the appropriate level of income to draw. 
Beyond the free guidance, many DC customers will need fully 
regulated advice, which recent research demonstrates is not 
readily available at an acceptable cost.
Behavioural economics tells us that when faced with complex 
decisions, consumers are heavily influenced by how the options 
are presented by providers and advisers, who might not have the 
customer’s best interests at heart. 
7. The sales of annuities will decline, due to the new trivial 
commutation and drawdown rules – possibly triggering 
a period of instability in the market with the collapse or 
withdrawal of smaller insurers.  Longevity insurance in 
the form of individually underwritten lifetime annuities 
(LTAs) is expected to remain a crucial element of DC 
decumulation. However, the age at which longevity insurance 
comes into efect is likely to be higher than historically. Deferring 
an annuity means most purchases will be made much later 
in life. The deferment of the purchase of longevity insurance 
until age 70-80, for example, in the form of the LTA, might well 
be a sensible strategy, given the low rates available, especially 
to younger retirees in good health. Nevertheless, it might be 
sensible to purchase longevity insurance (in the form of a 
deferred annuity) at the time of retirement in order to ring-fence 
a secured retirement income in later life.
However, it is hard to assess whether LTAs are being 
appropriately priced and ofer good value for money – and this 
is true even when they are sold to pensioners in their mid-to-
late-70s, as well as to new retirees. Insurers do need to build in 
a prudent mortality bufer into their pricing models, given the 
potential length of retirement. However, the mortality bufer is 
only part of the load that insurers add to the modelled annuity 
price to cover other items such as administration and profit. The 
question the FCA needs to ask in its competition investigation 
is this: ‘is the mortality and profit margin built into the annuity 
price excessive in relation to the capital the insurer needs to 
  Second, there are inevitable individual investment and 
longevity risks associated with a mass market for drawdown. 
No amount of improvement in product design or reduction in 
charges can remove these risks. 
  Third, longevity insurance, in the form of a lifetime annuity, 
will remain an essential component of the DC retirement 
income market, especially for the later stage of retirement, when 
insurance becomes more attractive and appropriate relative to 
keeping assets invested.
  Fourth, improvements in product design and/or reductions 
in charges cannot compensate for inadequate contributions into 
DC pension schemes, particularly if the government wants DC 
pots to fund care costs in later life. This remains a fundamental 
problem for the UK DC model. 
We believe that there is now a golden opportunity for all 
players involved in pensions policy to consider whether and how 
an institutional model could be applied to the decumulation, as 
well as the accumulation, phase of DC pensions. 
Any new institutional structure would have to address the 
optimal age to purchase longevity insurance – in other words, 
the age at which a lifetime annuity should come into efect. It 
would also have to address what are the most efective and 
eficient products both to provide and defer income in the period 
between retirement and the purchase of longevity insurance. 
These new ideas need further debate, and further work needs 
urgently to be done on their design, and on the governance and 
regulatory framework in which they could operate.
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allocate to support its annuity business?’. What is already clear 
from the FCA’s thematic review is that the sale of annuities to an 
insurer’s existing customers is more profitable than competing 
for business in the open market.
8. The FCA, among others, argues that more people should 
purchase an enhanced annuity. While enhanced annuities 
better reflect life expectancy, and therefore deliver a better rate 
to those with relevant lifestyle and medical factors, there are 
two important caveats. First, under the proposed April 2015 
regime, those with severe life-shortening conditions, who have 
dependants, might be better of not annuitising, so that on 
death, any residual fund goes to their estate. Second, there is no 
regulatory definition of ‘enhanced’ and no benchmark rates: a 
very slight increase in relation to an uncompetitive internal rate 
qualifies for the description ‘enhanced’. It is important to note 
here that insurance companies are not obliged to ofer enhanced 
annuities although, if they do not, they must explain the potential 
benefits of enhanced rates to customers in pre-retirement 
literature.
9. Innovation in the DC decumulation market was evident 
well before the 2014 Budget. However, for this to benefit 
DC customers, it is important for the government and 
regulators to take a clear view of what a good outcome 
means in practice. This should combine suitability (efective) 
and value for money (eficient, competitive), and might be 
expressed as a four-stage process to ensure: (a) the right timing, 
(b) the right decumulation product, (c) the right features, and (d) 
a competitive price. 
 
Innovation, therefore, needs to address the following   
three issues: 
a. The optimal age to purchase longevity insurance and the  
optimal age at which the longevity insurance comes into   
efect (i.e., the age at which the LTA is purchased).
b. The most efective and eficient products for providing   
income drawdown in the deferral period between retirement  
and the age at which the longevity insurance comes into   
efect.
c. The impact of deferring the LTA purchase on local authority 
means-testing, of eligibility for support with long-term care costs. 
This currently requires the individual to pay fees in full until 
capital falls below £23,250.
10. Innovators need to recognise that, at some point 
between age 70 and age 80, it will become optimal for 
most DC customers to switch between income drawdown 
and longevity insurance since the implied return on a 
LTA – as a result of the high mortality premium at these 
ages – exceeds any realistic return available in the financial 
markets. 
An appropriate deferment product for the mass market, 
which can be integrated into auto-enrolment, might be 
described as one that:
a. Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing
b. Delivers a reasonably reliable income stream (i.e., with   
minimal fluctuations)
c. Maintains the purchasing power of the fund
d. Ofers the flexibility to purchase the LTA at any time (or   
at regular predetermined intervals to hedge interest rate and  
mortality risk)
e. Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost
f. Requires minimal consumer engagement, e.g.,  by ofering a  
high-quality default option
g. Benefits from a low-cost delivery system.
Products:
1. The pensions industry should work towards the replacement 
of the sales-driven retail annuity market with improved retirement 
income solutions under an institutional auto-enrolment model, 
characterised by a seamless transition between the two phases 
of the pension process: accumulation and decumulation.  
An institutional asset-management scheme-based approach to 
DC decumulation in the early years of retirement, combined with 
institutional annuitisation, would represent a much more efective 
and eficient market:
a. ‘Scheme drawdown’ products are expected to be introduced 
to the market in 2014. The concept appears to provide a rational 
asset management alternative to annuitisation (full longevity 
insurance) during the early years of retirement, not least because 
whatever is left in the fund can be inherited if the scheme 
member dies early. Over the longer term, it ofers the potential 
for higher returns than might be available via an annuity, but at 
the cost of increased investment and longevity risk. Scheme  
drawdown might take the form of a series of target-date funds 
that ofer flexible membership periods or are fully liquid, so 
that members can buy a LTA at any time. This option might be 
ofered by multi-employer, multi-trust auto-enrolment schemes. 
It might also be provided by the national scheme, NEST, so that 
it is available to all DC customers, including the self-employed – a 
long-neglected sector of the DC population.
While scheme drawdown does not replicate the risk   
pooling concept of annuities, it does maintain the  
collectivisation and pooling concept of large-scale, trust-based  
multi-employer DC schemes. 
We stress, however, that the longevity risk associated with 
drawdown of people running out of money if they live longer 
will not be made more palatable through improvements in 
product design and distribution. This risk, and the costs of 
hedging it, cannot be ignored. Moreover, the asset allocation 
of the accumulation fund in the pre-retirement years will need 
to be modified, as at present, this de-risking phase is designed 
to meet the needs of those who take 25% as tax-free cash and 
use the rest of the fund to buy a LTA. All of these risks will need 
to be communicated to – and understood by – DC customers, 
otherwise there is a very real danger the DC market will face 
future mis-selling scandals.
b. ‘Institutional annuitisation’ is already prevalent in the DB 
bulk buy-out market, where economies of scale can benefit 
scheme members as well as providers. If this model could be 
adapted for the DC auto-enrolment market, it could deliver 
better value for money. This model might be implemented via 
a national clearing house to ensure universal access. It might 
also be ofered by the large-scale DC schemes, once they have 
achieved the necessary critical mass, and where they have 
adopted scheme drawdown. 
Recommendations
Regulation:
2. The regulators should ensure that the new flexible regime for 
drawdown is efective and eficient. They must also proactively 
monitor new regulated products coming on to the market and 
warn DC customers about the risks of unregulated investments.
a. The FCA should ensure that DC customers are not exploited 
where they take advantage of the more flexible income 
drawdown rules in 2014-15 and, in particular, the very flexible rules 
proposed for April 2015. Current alternatives to LTAs must be 
evaluated urgently. The FCA should use its product-intervention 
powers to prevent a flood of unsuitable products entering the 
market. These powers allow it to restrict certain product features, 
control which products are sold and to which types of customer, 
and to ban a product altogether. It should issue clear warnings 
about the dangers of investing the whole of the DC pot in a 
single type of investment, for example buy-to-let, and in particular 
about the dangers of unregulated investments, including those 
that are legal and those that are scams. 
b. The FCA  should revise the rules on drawdown (Regulatory 
Update 55), introduced in 1998, which allow advisers and 
providers to understate the investment risks associated with this 
product and which facilitate the recommendation of high-risk 
investment strategies in order to ofset high costs. 
c. The FCA  should ensure that the face-to-face guidance regime, 
to be introduced in 2015, is separated from all sales processes 
to avoid conflicts of interest. The guidance should be delivered 
via an intermediary that is genuinely impartial, which means it 
must have no connection to insurance companies and asset 
managers.
The guidance regime must address the need for individuals 
to fully understand the costs, investment risk and longevity risk 
they bear if they do not annuitise. It must also assist with the 
selection of the annual income drawn down with reference to the 
marginal rate of income tax and in relation to the risk of drawing 
too much income in the early years of retirement, leaving their 
DC funds exhausted in later retirement. 
Due to the complexity of new choices, in many cases, DC 
customers will also need regulated advice. The development of 
the new guidance regime, therefore, should be accompanied 
by an overhaul of SIPP regulation, and the advice market and 
its regulation. All intermediaries – whether they ofer regulated 
advice, non-advice, or guidance, should be required to adhere 
to a robust code of conduct, as recommended by the Financial 
Services Consumer Panel [FSCP 2013]. The code would be 
strengthened by the introduction of a clear measure of, and 
guidance on, the practical meaning of value for money, which 
would help avoid mis-selling and mis-buying scandals in the DC 
decumulation market post-April 2015.
Key findings
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d. The FCA  should introduce a risk-based regulatory 
classification system for all DC decumulation products – LTAs 
and the alternatives, such as fixed-term annuities and income 
drawdown – that takes account of a simple range of typical 
customer profiles, for example, in relation to age, state of health 
and dependants (partner, children for whom an inheritance is 
desired), etc.  
e. The FCA  and PRA should consider urgently the need to 
manage the consumer and market risks associated with a 
significant contraction in the annuity market. There is a real 
danger that one or more of the recent market entrants could fail, 
especially where this is a mono-line provider.  
f. The FCA  and The Pensions Regulator (TPR) should ensure 
that strong governance arrangements apply to the default 
investment option used for drawdown and that these are 
reviewed in the light of the new flexibility for DC decumulation. 
The current model – which assumes 25% of the fund will be 
taken as tax-free cash and the rest used for annuity purchase – 
will no longer be appropriate. This will be a complex challenge, 
as the potential scenarios vary significantly. Those with smaller 
pots might decide to withdraw the whole fund as cash – possibly 
over two or three years to avoid paying income tax at a higher 
rate – which would require a cash-based fund. Those with larger 
pots might decide to keep their fund fully invested, which would 
require a very diferent asset allocation that includes growth 
assets.  
g. FCA  and TPR should introduce clear guidance to trustees 
and other types of governance boards as soon as possible on 
the regulation of scheme drawdown and appropriate member 
communications.
h. FCA  TPR and the actuarial profession should examine 
the rules for cash-equivalent transfer values (CETVs), where 
members of DB schemes want to transfer to the DC regime, to 
ensure schemes do not exploit the new rules and provide poor 
value to members in order to of-load the DB liabilities from the 
sponsoring employer’s balance sheet.
i. FCA , TPR and the actuarial profession should consider 
the risks in existing annuity bulk buy-ins and buy-outs, where an 
insurance company’s covenant has been weakened by the loss 
of business in the retail market and a fall in the company’s share 
price.
Government
3. The government should oversee the smooth introduction of 
the new flexible DC decumulation market. It should:
a. Ensure tax planning is embedded in the new guidance regime, 
so that consumers do not inadvertently pay a higher rate of tax 
by drawing too much income.
 
b. Set out clearly the impact of taking income and/or cash, rather 
than buying an annuity, in relation to local authority means-
testing for care home fees, should residential/nursing home care 
become necessary at some point.
c. Work closely with the FCA to evaluate new decumulation 
products launched in response to the tax rule changes and to 
pre-empt firms from introducing unsuitable (e.g., high risk) and 
unregulated investments that appear to ofer higher yields than 
are available through more suitable (lower-risk) and regulated 
products. 
d. Consider the introduction of full cost disclosure and a charge 
cap in the DC decumulation market at the same time that it 
makes these features a requirement for auto-enrolment DC 
schemes.
e. Above all, the government should recognise that consumers 
may face dificulties resulting from the diferent mechanisms 
involved in the accumulation and decumulation phases. 
The success of auto-enrolment has been predicated on 
the behavioural principle of inertia, while HMT’s planned 
reforms for April 2015 will produce a decumulation landscape 
requiring consumer engagement in making complex choices. 
Government needs to help consumers navigate the transition 
between these two phases to enable them to avoid potential 
pitfalls and get the most out of the reforms.
 
Section 1
the lifetime 
annuity market
Compared with defined benefit (DB) pension schemes, where 
the member receives a salary-linked retirement income for life, 
and where the investment and longevity risks are borne by the 
sponsoring employer, DC pension schemes and plans place all 
the risks on the individual. Nowhere is this more apparent than 
at retirement, when the individual must decide how to convert 
the accumulated fund into a lifetime income. For the majority of 
people who need to replace an earned income immediately with 
a pension income at the point they stop working, the decision 
is complex and pressured, frequently leading to ill-informed 
purchases of retirement income products. This problem cannot 
be ignored, as the government recognised in its 2014 Budget 
announcements and in HMT’s Freedom and Choice in Pensions 
consultation paper.1  
DC is now the main pension arrangement in the private 
sector. Auto-enrolment will bring up to 11m new employees into 
workplace DC schemes in a market that is expected to grow 
from about £276bn assets under management (AUM) in 2012 
to an estimated £1.7trn by 2030.2 Employers are introducing the 
new pension system between October 2012 and 2018 and it is to 
be hoped that employees will be able to consolidate pots from 
older high-charging schemes and plans, where appropriate, into 
these new low-cost arrangements.3
Auto-enrolment schemes have been the focus of policy 
and regulatory attention over the past two years in particular, 
resulting in very significant improvements. The original DC model 
– based on the retail personal pension, which emerged in the late 
1980s, and encumbered by flawed governance and high charges 
– has been transformed into an institutional accumulation model 
that passes on to members the benefits of economies of scale 
in relation to governance, asset management, administration, 
and charges. Unfortunately this transformation has excluded the 
decumulation phase of DC.
In this section, we begin with a brief analysis of the sweeping 
tax rule changes introduced in the 2014 Budget. We also look at 
the current retail DC decumulation market, which is ineficient 
and inefective in comparison with the institutional structure of 
the new multi-trust, multi-employer DC auto-enrolment schemes. 
This overview puts into context our analysis of the lifetime 
annuity (LTA) which, we argue, remains a crucial feature of the 
DC decumulation market and could become a very efective 
and eficient product, if purchased at the appropriate age 
via an instituional-style process. At present it is purchased 
by about 90% of DC customers at retirement.4 The current 
alternatives to the LTA for DC customers in the early years of 
retirement are explored in Section 2 and emerging alternatives 
in Section 3, seeking out the most suitable products and delivery 
mechanisms for the post-2014 Budget environment.
A note on terminology: For the sake of simplicity, we use 
‘DC customer’ as a generic description to denote members 
of workplace DC schemes and those with individual pension 
plans, including the self-employed and employees who have 
built up small pots from membership of contract-based group 
DC arrangements (group personal pensions and stakeholder 
schemes) with former employers. 
1.1 The 2014 Budget  
The 2014 Budget, delivered on 19 March 2014, introduced the 
most significant overhaul of the DC decumulation tax rules since 
the Finance Act 1921.5 We set out the details here and begin our 
consideration of the consequences – intended and unintended – 
which continues in Sections 2 and 3. 
The FCA issued guidance in early April 2014 that included a 
requirement for advisers and providers to ensure customers are 
aware of the proposed major changes scheduled for April 2015 
before making a decision based on the 2013-2014 rules.6 This 
is crucial, since otherwise less scrupulous practitioners might 
try to sell restrictive products, such as fixed-term annuities, in 
advance of the introduction of the more flexible regime. The FCA 
guidance to firms should ensure that, if this occurs, customers 
will have reasonable grounds for claiming they were victims 
1HM Treasury, 2014, Freedom and Choice in Pensions. 2Pensions Institute, 2014, VFM: Assessing value for money in defined contribution default funds. 3The 
exception might be where an older pension plan has a guaranteed annuity rate (GAR) that is significantly higher than prevailing rates. 4FCA 2014, Thematic 
Review of Annuities. 5HM Treasury, 2014, Freedom and Choice in Pensions. 6The FCA’s guidance can be found here: http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/
finalised-guidance/fg14-03   
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of mis-selling and be able to take the case to the Financial 
Ombudsman Scheme.
1.1.1 Immediate changes
Trivial commutation pre-Budget: A DC customer who was 
aged 60 or more, and who had total pension savings worth 
no more than £18,000, could withdraw the DC pot(s) as cash, 
the first 25% of which was tax-free and the rest taxable at the 
marginal rate.7 In addition, up to two small personal pension 
pots, worth £2,000 or less, could be taken as a lump sum 
(taxed as per trivial commutation), even where total pension 
savings were worth more than the £18,000 limit.
From 27 March 2014: For DC customers aged 60 or over:
  The amount of total pension wealth, all of which an 
individual can take as a lump sum, is increased from £18,000 to 
£30,000.
  The maximum size of small pension pots which can be taken 
as a lump sum, regardless of total pension wealth, is increased 
from £2,000 to £10,000 and the number of personal pots that 
can be taken under these rules is increased from two to three.  
  The tax treatment of lump sums remains the same.
  The new rules are not retrospective: those who have already 
made an annuity purchase with a small pot will not be able to 
reverse the contract.
Income drawdown pre-Budget: The maximum income that 
could be taken under the main drawdown arrangement (known 
as ‘capped drawdown’ because the maximum annual income 
is capped) was 120% of the annuity rate set by the Government 
Actuary’s Department (GAD). To qualify for ‘flexible drawdown’, 
where there is no cap on the maximum annual income, it was 
necessary to have an income of at least £20,000 per annum 
from secure pension sources (for example a combination of DB 
and state pensions).
From 27 March 2014:
  The capped drawdown limit is raised from 120% to 150% of 
the GAD annuity rate.
  The minimum income requirement for flexible drawdown is 
reduced from £20,000 to £12,000
The overall impact of the Budget changes for 2014-15 is that 
an estimated additional 85,000 people – approximately one-
quarter of DC retirees for this period – will be eligible to access 
flexible drawdown or to take their pot(s) as a lump sum.
1.1.2 2015 changes
Much more radical changes will be introduced in April 2015, but 
these are subject to further consultation during 2014, followed 
by new legislation. 
7The value of the pension pot in a DB scheme is the annual pension multiplied by 20. If there is a lump sum in addition, this must be added to the value of the 
pension pot. DB schemes calculate pensions for trivial commutation purposes, but where there is more than one DB scheme involved, the cash-equivalent 
values must be combined. The DB scheme administrator will deduct any tax due at the basic rate of 20% and should provide a P45 showing how much tax has 
been paid. Overpayments can be claimed back from HMRC. Underpayments are settled via the self-assessment tax return. 8The new rules also blur the lines 
between pensions and individual savings accounts (ISAs), which may or may not be intentional – i.e., a longer-term HMT plan might be to merge the two 
tax-efficient savings regimes. 
Cash or drawdown choice for all: The main change is to allow 
DC customers aged 55 and over to draw down from their fund 
however they wish – i.e., as income or cash – irrespective of the 
fund size and other sources of pension income. As previously, 
it will be possible to take a 25% tax-free lump sum. All additional 
funds drawn will be subject to the marginal rate of income tax.
DC retirees who recently took a tax-free lump sum from their 
defined contribution (DC) pension have 18 months to decide 
what to do with the rest of their savings – previously this was six 
months. This means that they will not be put at a disadvantage 
should they wish to wait to draw on their DC pot under the 
more flexible rules planned for April 2015.
Free guidance for all: A crucial new feature of the regime will 
be to ensure that all DC customers have access to free and 
impartial face-to-face guidance on their full range of options. 
Pension providers and schemes will be required to deliver a 
‘guidance guarantee’ by April 2015. The FCA is responsible 
for making sure this guidance ‘meets robust standards, 
working closely with consumer groups’. To help finance this 
unprecedented initiative, the government is making available a 
£20m development fund.
Rise in DC pension age: By 2028, when the state pension rises 
to 67, the minimum age at which it will be possible to access a 
DC fund will rise from 55 to 57.
1.1.3 Budget impact
The government will now consult with consumer bodies and 
the industry on the most significant changes, which it plans 
to introduce in April 2015. The government will also address 
concerns over access to the new DC decumulation flexibility for 
members of private sector DB schemes.  It has already said that 
it intends to prevent members of public-sector DB schemes 
– most of which are unfunded – from transferring into the DC 
regime.
While the confirmed details for 2014-15 will have a significant 
impact, the proposals for April 2015, if approved, would change 
the DC decumulation market beyond recognition, largely 
replacing annuity purchase at the point of retirement with 
cash withdrawals and regular income drawdown. This is a big 
gamble for the government, as it means that many DC retirees 
will retain investment and longevity risks by using drawdown 
instead of annuities and in many cases might not realise the 
implications.8 
The Treasury is expecting net tax receipts from the recent 
round of changes of £3bn over the next five years (£320m in 
2015/16; £600m in 2016/2017; £910 in 2017/2018; and £1.2bn in 
2018/2019; with a net gain every year until 2023). The figures 
are based on assumptions about increased income tax on 
withdrawals above the 25% tax-free lump sum, but also on an 
increase in inheritance tax, i.e. the additional tax receipts from 
DC funds on death that will go to the Treasury, rather than to 
insurers’ reserves, as is the case with annuities.
It is impossible to predict how many people might take 
their whole funds as cash, but it is important to remember that, 
once the 25% tax-free cash has been taken, the rest of the fund 
drawn will be subject to the individual’s marginal tax rate in the 
relevant year. This means that DC investors, whom we would 
expect to want to try to minimise their tax liability, are likely to 
only withdraw amounts that do not push them into a higher-
rate tax for any given year. However, since most DC pots are 
worth less than £50,000, and about half are worth less than 
£15,000, it would be possible to withdraw these sums over a 
small number of years and still avoid paying a higher rate of 
income tax.
Moreover, the negative perception of annuities might 
prompt DC customers to conclude that all retirement income 
products ofer poor value for money and sufer from high and 
opaque charges. As this report demonstrates, this might be a 
rational conclusion at present, but it would be detrimental to 
DC customers in the longer term – and as pot sizes increase – if 
they sufered unnecessary income tax in order to ‘liberate’ their 
pension assets. 
We are also concerned about HMT’s9 positive references 
to overseas markets, where annuitisation is not the norm. In 
Australia, for example, the DC customer’s freedom to take cash 
has given rise to concerns over the use of DC pots for short-
term aspirational spending projects at the expense of longer-
term income needs. The description ‘double-dipping’, which 
is used in Australia (full compulsion), and also in New Zealand 
(auto-enrolment), describes this kind of spending behaviour, 
which forces pensioners to fall back on means-tested state 
benefits in later retirement.
One issue that has not been clarified as yet is the impact of 
keeping the DC fund invested post-retirement on means testing 
for care home fees. At present, if it becomes necessary to enter 
a nursing or residential home, under local authority means-
testing rules, if you have assets of more than £23,250, you will 
need to pay the full cost of your care. Your income is also taken 
into account.10  
It is to be hoped that DC customers who do not want to buy 
an annuity will use drawdown as a means of spreading income 
over the full retirement period and that the government’s 
proposed new impartial guidance system will ensure that they 
fully understand the investment and longevity risks they will 
now bear as a consequence. 
The use of behavioural economics analysis will be important 
here. Consumers will need to make complex decisions in 
relation to the level of income they take each year and the point 
9HM Treasury, 2014, Freedom and Choice in Pensions. 10See http://www.ageuk.org.uk/home-and-care/care-homes/paying-for-permanent-residential-care/. We are 
grateful to the Actuarial Users Group of the Financial Reporting Council for bringing this point to our attention. 11FSCP, 2013, Annuities: Time for Regulatory 
Chance. 12HM Treasury, 2014, Freedom and Choice in Pensions.
at which it might be appropriate to buy an annuity. Decisions 
need to take into account taxation, investment risk, inflation 
risk and longevity risk. Behavioural economics tells us that 
consumers’ choices are influenced significantly by behavioural 
biases, their capacity to make informed decisions, and by the 
ways in which the options are presented. Decisions might also 
be influenced by lack of trust in the pensions, investment and 
advice markets, which might encourage people to withdraw all 
of their money and to put it in a ‘safe’ home, such as a deposit 
account. 
DC customers will be very vulnerable to the less scrupulous 
providers and advisers. Therefore the government and the 
regulators must spell out clearly the risks associated with 
non-pension investments. Since the Budget there has been 
speculation that many DC customers will use their pots to 
invest in residential property via buy-to-let schemes. While 
bricks and mortar has long been a favoured ‘investment’ in 
the UK, the concentration of risk, where an individual relies on 
residential property to deliver growth (their own home) and 
income (buy-to-let), has all the hallmarks of a trend that will end 
in tears.
Of particular concern – especially in this low-yield 
environment – is the potential susceptibility of DC customers 
to wholly inappropriate investments, where they might not 
understand the high costs and high risks involved. In addition, 
the government and regulators should be very concerned 
about unregulated products and scams. Unscrupulous firms 
that operate on either side of the borders of legality will see 
the new regime as a golden opportunity to part unsuspecting 
pension savers from their money.
Our most immediate concern, however, is that current 
drawdown products are not suitable for the potential mass 
market April 2015 heralds, due to the investment risks and 
high costs we identify in Section 2. (In Section 3, we examine 
‘scheme drawdown’, which could replace the retail drawdown 
product with an institutional scheme-based model.)
A further problem with the current drawdown market is the 
cost of full advice. As the FSCP report said11, there has been a 
shift away from full advice in the DC decumulation market, in 
favour of the light regulation and commission-based non-
advice model. ‘Non-advice’ – also known as ‘guided’ advice – is 
a commission-based, predominantly sales-driven commodity 
distribution channel. Technically, this is execution-only, where 
the DC investor takes responsibility for the purchase.
To help people make the right decisions, one of the 
proposed 2015 changes is a new advice regime that promises 
to give all DC customers free, face-to-face guidance that is 
‘impartial and high-quality’. In HMT’s consultation report12 2014, 
the government said:
“In order to ensure that this guidance really is impartial and 
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high quality, providers and trust-based schemes will be required 
to ensure that the guidance follows a set of robust standards. 
These standards will be designed to ensure that guidance 
focuses on helping consumers understand the choices 
open to them, how to engage with products and providers 
confidently and knowledgeably, and how to access professional 
independent financial advice where it is appropriate for them 
to do so. The government will ask the FCA (working closely 
with the Pensions Regulator and the Department for Work 
and Pensions in relation to standards for trust-based pension 
schemes) to coordinate the development of these standards, 
and the framework for monitoring compliance. In developing 
these standards the FCA will work in close partnership with 
consumer groups, the Pensions Advisory Service, and the 
Money Advice Service. The guidance will be developed using 
insights from behavioural economics, as well as the expertise of 
consumer groups and others, to ensure that it promotes better 
understanding and active choice.”
It will clearly be a significant challenge to deliver this 
guidance to some 400,000 DC customers (about 8,000-
10,000 per week) 13 – a number that will rise rapidly under 
auto-enrolment. We argue that impartiality must be predicated 
on total independence of any sales process and therefore 
that ‘free’ means just that (the word is still used and abused 
by sales-driven annuity websites). It must also be predicated 
on a complete absence of insurance company influences, 
which means that the rapidly-growing number of financial 
relationships between insurance companies and distributors 
must be examined very carefully. 
Assuming that efective and eficient drawdown products 
can be made available in the mass market – preferably via 
scheme drawdown rather than retail products – then this is 
likely to represent a better alternative to annuitisation in the 
early years of retirement, especially for those in good health. 
In some cases, retirees might use drawdown for a short period 
in order to create a breathing space during which they can 
consider their annuity options more carefully. In many cases, it 
is likely that drawdown could be used for a considerable period, 
e.g., up to the mid-to-late 70s. At this point, the annuity purchase 
would be made with reference to the needs of later retirement 
and long-term care (LTC), which is one of the government’s 
objectives for the reforms. For all of these reasons, the FCA’s 
competition review of the annuity market, which we assume 
will investigate pricing and profitability, remains crucial for the 
continued use of annuities as the best hedge for longevity risk 
in later retirement.
It is not clear what the impact of these changes will have on 
the way that insurance companies underwrite annuity business. 
13The exact number is not known. The ABI annuity data shows that about 420,000 annuities are sold each year, but in an unknown number of cases individuals 
will make more than one annuity purchase, particularly where they have multiple pots. There are only about 20,000 financial advisers in the UK. 14It is not clear  
if the government will change the tax treatment of LTAs. 15FCA, 2014, Thematic Review of Annuities. 16Data on existing members is imprecise, however. For 
example, where an employee changes jobs and leaves an employer’s scheme, under a trust-based scheme, the ex-employee becomes a deferred member and 
remains the responsibility of the trustees. Where the scheme is contract-based, the connection with the scheme is severed completely and the ex-employee’s 
pension pot is reclassified as an individual personal pension customer of the insurance company – and in many cases a higher charge might apply. Where active 
members (i.e., employees) benefit from a low AMC, leavers can be subjected to a deferred member penalty, which can increase the AMC significantly. 
As the annuity market contracts, the insurance pool of 
annuitants will shrink, leading to a smaller spread of ‘lives’ and a 
lower diversification of risk. Moreover, insurers will no doubt be 
concerned about the adverse selection implications of a market 
where purchases are entirely voluntary. 14 The combination of 
these factors could lead to lower rates for those who want to 
purchase a LTA.
There will be other pressing matters for the FCA and PRA. 
The Budget will lead to a significant fall in the £12bn-a-year 
annuity market, as was anticipated in the sharp fall in the share 
prices of insurance companies, particularly those that specialise 
in annuity business and therefore do not have a diverse 
business model. While the rapid drop in insurance company 
share prices, on the day of the Budget and the week that 
followed, might have been an overreaction, there is no doubt 
that analysts will be looking at how the loss of annuity business 
will afect insurance company profitability and sustainablity. 
This applies not only to the retail market, but also to the annuity 
bulk buy-out market, where the insurance company’s financial 
strength or ‘covenant’ is a crucial issue and where there is 
also evidence that advisers to trustees and employers will try 
to exploit the new DC tax regime as a means to of-load DB 
liabilities using ‘innovative’ transfer techniques. The FCA, PRA 
and TPR should monitor developments here very closely.
1.2 The reasons for the overhaul  
of the DC decumulation market 
The radical overhaul to DC decumulation tax rules was the 
government’s response to growing evidence that the current 
market did not work in the consumer’s best interests. The FCA’s 
February 2014 annuity report described the annuity market 
as ‘dysfunctional’ 15 and therefore of major concern given that 
about 10.5m consumers have a DC pension that will need to be 
converted into an income at some point and that as many as 
11m additional employees will become members of workplace 
DC schemes under auto-enrolment, joining the approximately 
5m who became members under the voluntary system.16 
The FCA report found that 60% of DC customers buy an 
annuity from their current provider and that of these, 80% 
could get a better rate on the open market. Small pots (pre-
Budget) were of particular concern, since the number of 
providers in the open market begins to fall of at about £15,000 
and only two providers are thought to ofer an Open Market 
Option (OMO) for pots of £5,000. Pensions Institute analysis of 
annuity sales figures, reported in the Financial Times in January 
2014, shows that the median value of purchases is around 
£15,000 and that this is a more meaningful figure than the 
‘average’ of £33,455 frequently quoted by the ABI 17, 18.  
The dysfunctional nature of the annuity market is even 
more evident when compared with the advances made in 
the accumulation market. As the Pensions Institute repeatedly 
stresses, the success of auto-enrolment is predicated on 
member inertia in an environment where increasingly trustees 
take full responsibility for good member outcomes. It is for this 
reason that the government and regulators have pressed for 
an accumulation phase where the default process – including 
the default fund which 90-97% of auto-enrolees are expected 
to use – is subjected to rigorous independent governance 
standards, either by a board of trustees (trust-based schemes) 
or a governance board (contract-based DC). Compared with 
the early days of group personal pensions in the late 1980s, 
it can be argued that the transition from a retail model to an 
institutional model is virtually complete in modern schemes.19   
The benefits of institutional governance and the cost savings 
of the modern auto-enrolment multi-employer, multi-trust 
scheme come to an abrupt end at the point of retirement, 
when it is assumed that the provision of information about 
decumulation options – and in particular about the OMO –  
is suficient to discharge the trustees’ responsibilities and to 
ensure members will make an informed decision.  This is a 
premature conclusion to the trustees’ fiduciary duties and 
represents a serious breakdown in governance in the auto-
enrolment system.  
To contextualise the analysis of the flaws in the current 
DC-decumulation market, it is helpful to consider what a good 
outcome at decumulation might look like. We suggest that this 
combines suitability (efective) and value for money (eficient), 
and might be expressed as a four-stage process to ensure:
1. The right timing
2. The right decumulation product relative to taxation and to 
investment, inflation and longevity risks
3. The right features
4. A competitive price at the point of sale and ongoing, where 
applicable
Suitability includes a clear understanding of the product 
characteristics and the associated risks. The factors that need 
to be considered more carefully in relation to the DC customer’s 
profile and needs (e.g., age, state of health, dependants, etc) 
include:
1. Longevity insurance and the appropriate age at which it 
comes into efect
2. Cost (immediate/ongoing)
3. Inflation risk
17FT Jan 31 2014. 18In other words, 50% of purchasers have pots of less than £15,000 and 75% of purchasers have pots of less than £33,455. Of the 420,000 
annuity purchases, about 20% of pots (80-90,000) are worth above £50,000 and 6% (26-27,000) are above £100,000. 19Although we stress that in the light of 
the Budget changes, all schemes should be required to review their default investment option, to ensure that it is appropriate in an environment where fewer 
members will purchase annuities at age 65 and the de-risking glide path now terminates at age 55 for some members.
4. Investment risk (and reinvestment risk for short-term products)
5. Flexibility, e.g., to change to a diferent product when necessary
6. Death benefits
7. Execution risk (mis-selling/mis-buying)
The pre-Budget landscape could be described as follows. 
Most DC customers bought a LTA with the proceeds of their 
individual personal pension plans and workplace schemes 
– usually after taking 25% tax-free cash. In certain cases, this 
was likely to be due to life-shortening medical and lifestyle 
conditions (see Enhanced Annuities in Section 2). While an 
estimated 40-60% of DC customers might qualify for an 
enhancement, the number of enhanced sales has remained 
comparatively low, particularly in rollover sales (sales to existing 
pension customers by insurance companies).  There has been 
no analysis of which we are aware that has set out the levels 
of enhancements and compared these with the top rates for 
standard and enhanced annuities in the open market. Another 
‘informed’ reason for immediate annuitisation was where the 
individual had no dependants and therefore could focus on 
maximise income rather than on passing on death benefits. 
The majority of DC customers have annuitised immediately 
at retirement because they needed to replace an earned 
income that has ceased. This pattern has been driven by 
pressure that is not necessarily in the customers’ best interests. 
For example, there are very significant vested interests on 
the sell-side (insurance company scheme providers) and also 
conflicts of interest on the part of trustees of DC schemes. 
Insurance companies that sell both DC pensions and annuities 
have a vested interest in retaining customers’ pension pots 
at retirement and also by capturing other customers via the 
LTA open market option. Trustees of DC schemes are able 
to discharge all responsibility to members at the point of the 
annuity purchase, which builds in a strong behavioural bias 
in the guidance they give to their members. In some cases, 
the trustees and the provider are one and the same. Whether 
trustees like it or not, the Budget changes will extend their 
relationship with and responsibility for scheme members who 
opt for drawdown rather than purchase an annuity, as they will 
remain in the scheme.
These conflicts of interest and vested interests are 
compounded by a regulatory system that appears to favour 
LTAs, due to the guarantees that they ofer, and which does not 
appear to understand the risks associated with this product 
in terms of the absence of inflation protection, historically 
low annuity rates due to quantitative easing, the impact of 
the increased use of individual underwriting techniques 
on the annuity risk pool, among other factors. The current 
alternatives to the LTA are characterised by one or more of the 
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same factors, so while conceptually they introduce alternative 
decumulation strategies, they are not suitable for the mass 
market, particularly in the case of retail drawdown products. 
Moreover the system took – and might continue to take – 
little or no account of the pressure on DC customers, at a very 
dificult and stressful time in their lives, to make a complex and, 
in the case of the LTA, an irreversible decumulation decision for 
which there is no learning curve. The Holmes and Rahe stress 
scale,20 which was based on their Social Readjustment Rating 
Scale (SRRS), shows that retirement is among the top-10 major 
stress events in life, out of a total of 43 that range from death of 
a spouse to a minor violation of the law21.
In some cases, the decision to annuitise is based on a 
simple, but widespread misunderstanding about tax-free cash 
and decumulation. It is possible to take the tax-free cash and to 
leave the rest of the pot in the pension fund, until the income is 
needed, yet we were told by an annuity adviser that about one-
third of LTAs are purchased at age 55 on the assumption that 
this is the only way to get access to the cash.
We summarise our concerns about the current DC 
decumulation market as follows:
1. DC customers are pressurised into the LTA purchase at 
retirement by providers, trustees and distributors that have 
vested and/or conflicts of interest.
2. The decumulation decision, which usually involves making a 
complex irreversible decision, takes place at the worst possible 
time – i.e. immediately pre-retirement, which is a period of 
considerable stress and uncertainty.
3. There is now an outdated assumption that longevity 
insurance – in the form of the LTA – is appropriate and 
represents value for money for customers who are in good 
health, have dependants, and are in the 55-75 age range.  
4. Current alternatives to the LTA embed considerable risks that 
are often not recognised by or explained to purchasers. 
5. There are no price caps in the DC decumulation market. 
While it can be argued, with justification, that, in an eficient 
market with well-informed consumers, competition ensures 
fair pricing, the evidence [FCA 2014, FSCP 2013] indicates that 
the buy-side (annuitants) generally are not well-informed and 
therefore do not exercise the required competitive pressures, 
particularly as the LTA purchase is one-of and irreversible, so 
there is no learning curve.22
6. The commercial interests of insurance companies are such 
that they are likely to direct their DC customers towards their 
‘roll-over’ products in cases where customers do not want to 
buy an annuity.
7. Under auto-enrolment, the retail DC decumulation phase 
is disconnected from the modern institutional accumulation 
phase.
8. The default investment option in most pension schemes is 
geared towards the purchase of an annuity at age 65. 
20The top-10 stress events on the scale are: death of a spouse, divorce, marital separation, imprisonment, the death of a close family member, personal injury or 
illness, marriage, dismissal from work, marital reconciliation, and retirement. 21Holme & Rache, 1967, the Social Readjustment Rating Scale. 22FCA, 2014, Thematic 
Review of Annuities, FSCP, 2013, Annuities: Time for Regulatory Change. 23Retirement Academy 2013, Annuities at a Tipping Point.
1.3 How the lifetime annuity (LTA) 
market works
The LTA is an insurance policy that guarantees an income for 
life in return for the DC pension fund (the insurance premium). 
As a perfect hedge against longevity risk (i.e., the individual 
will not run out of money before dying), LTAs play an essential 
role in DC decumulation and, we stress, will continue to do 
so. As a long-term insurance product, the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) guarantees 90% of the annuity 
rate in the case of an insurance company failure. Most, but 
not all insurance companies that sell DC pensions, also sell 
annuities. About 12 insurers sell in the open market and of these 
about five represent 75% of open-market business by volume. 
The purchaser is described as an annuitant. The ‘annuity 
rate’ is the income the insurance company guarantees to pay 
per annum in return for the lump sum. It can also be expressed 
as a percentage yield of the premium. The rate is calculated 
according to the insurance company’s assumptions in relation 
to a range of factors, in particular mortality assumptions and 
gilt yields. The gilt yield is the benchmark for the main financial 
instruments insurance companies purchase to back their 
guarantees, namely, gilts, but also investment-grade corporate 
bonds. According to a report published by the Retirement 
Academy in early 2013, the yield on gilts and corporate bonds 
had fallen to the lowest level since records began in 1703.23 The 
report explains that when the gilt yield was 4.79% in March 
2005, the ‘payback’ period (the number of years it takes for 
the insurance company to return the full premium or original 
capital) was 14.3 years. In March 2013, when the gilt yield was 
2.47%, the pay-back period was 17.9 years. The Retirement 
Academy argues that ‘those investing in annuities at the 
moment are giving their capital to insurance companies, only 
to get back their original capital plus a small amount of interest’. 
We should point out that this is not strictly correct since it 
ignores the mortality drag (or premium) embodied in the 
annuity rate.
1.3.1 Pricing risk and the annuity rate
LTAs operate on the basis that the insurance companies selling 
annuities pool the mortality risks of the annuitants.  Each 
individual annuitant’s lifetime is uncertain, but if the pool of 
annuitants is large enough, then the distribution of (i.e., the 
range of possible) lifetimes within the pool becomes much 
more predictable. This enables the insurance company to 
predict with a high degree of accuracy how many annuitants 
can be expected to die each year, even if it does not know in 
advance who those annuitants will be.  This is important for the 
purpose of pricing annuities.  
Annuities are priced using ‘discounted cash flow’ 
methods:  
  First, the insurance company needs to forecast the likely 
future pattern of annuity payments.  Let us assume it has 
sold annuities to 1,000 65-year olds each paying £1 p.a. Let 
us also assume that the insurance company forecasts that 
approximately 0.9% of the 65-year olds will die before they 
reach age 66, so it expects to pay out £991 in the first year. If 
approximately 1% of 66-year olds will die before they reach 67, 
the insurance company expects to pay out £981 in the second 
year, and so on.  
  Second, the expected future annuity payments are 
discounted using a discount rate that reflects the yield on 
assets that the insurance company will buy in order to make 
the annuity payments.  As mentioned, these assets will typically 
be gilts and high-grade corporate bonds.  
  Third, the insurance company will add a margin or load to 
the discounted value that it calculates.  This allows for factors 
such as administration costs, the insurance company’s profits, 
and a risk margin to account for various uncertainties in the 
forecasts it makes. 
We need to look at these uncertainties in more detail:
  First, there is mortality risk. This relates to the uncertainty 
about how long annuitants are going to live. There are 
two types of mortality risk: idiosyncratic mortality risk and 
systematic (or aggregate) mortality risk. The former is the 
risk that any given annuitant will live longer than the annuity 
provider predicts. This risk can be reduced significantly with a 
suficiently large pool of annuitants. The latter is the risk that all 
the annuitants will live longer than the annuity provider predicts 
as a result of, say, a medical breakthrough.
  Second, there is selection risk. This is the risk that the 
insurance company sells annuities to customers who know 
from their own family history that they are likely to live longer 
than average. If this happens, the insurance company is 
said to be ‘selected against’.  To deal with this, the insurance 
company uses diferent mortality tables for diferent classes of 
customers.  For 65-year old customers who purchase annuities 
as part of their pension schemes, the insurance company 
might predict that 0.9% of them will die before 66. But for 65-
year old customers purchasing annuities on a voluntary basis 
(PLAs), the insurance company might predict that only 0.75% 
of them will die before 66. The same stream of annual annuity 
payments will therefore cost a pension annuitant less than a 
voluntary annuitant.
  Third, there is interest rate risk. If interest rates fall, then 
the price of the bonds insurance companies buy to make the 
annuity payments increases.  This means that a given purchase 
price, e.g. £100,000, buys a lower annual payment (i.e., a lower 
annuity rate) when interest rates are low than when interest 
rates are high.
  Fourth, there is investment and re-investment risk. The 
insurance company needs to project the returns that it will 
receive on the assets – gilts and corporate bonds – it buys 
to make the annuity payments. The realised returns might 
be lower than expected. A key example of when this occurs 
is when the insurance company re-invests the principal 
repayment on a maturing bond. 
  Fifth, there is inflation risk. If inflation is higher than expected, 
then payments under an index-linked annuity will need to 
increase.
As a result of these risks, the market for annuities has 
become much more challenging in recent years and insurance 
companies have had to respond to these challenges where 
they have been able to do so. One of the biggest recent 
challenges has been the consequences of quantitative easing.  
This has significantly raised the price of long-term bonds and 
lowered annuity rates, making annuities much poorer value 
than before the global financial crisis that began in 2008. 
There is little insurance companies can do about this. There 
is also little insurance companies can currently do about 
systematic mortality risk. A market has recently started to 
hedge systematic mortality risk, but it is not yet fully developed.  
Because life expectancy is increasing much more rapidly than 
retirement ages have increased, insurance companies are 
currently paying out for 20-30 years, whereas it was half this 
length of time a half a century ago.
To overcome selection risk, insurance companies have 
introduced individual underwriting: this is where the insurance 
company prices on the basis of certain specific characteristics 
of the individual annuitant.  One example of this is post-code 
underwriting.  Insurance companies can work out from 
knowledge of a potential customer’s post code what their 
social class is (using data provided by information services 
companies such as Experian) and social class is a key predictor 
of life expectancy. Another example is lifestyle underwriting 
which involves the insurance company asking questions about 
the smoking, eating and drinking habits of potential customers 
and then ofering annuity quotes based on the customers’ 
answers.  Yet another example is medical underwriting where 
the insurance company asks whether a potential client 
has a history of cancer, heart disease, strokes, diabetes etc.  
Individual underwriting, therefore, has led to the introduction 
of lifestyle, enhanced and impaired life annuities, although, in 
practice, the specialist underwritings combine all the various 
factors in what is known as ‘deep underwriting’ (as opposed 
to ‘light underwriting’, which relies on a shorter and simpler 
questionnaire). 
Since individual underwriting is designed to get a better 
estimate of an individual annuitant’s life expectancy, it has the 
efect of reducing the efectiveness of risk pooling. Moreover, 
since an increasing number of new annuity sales involve 
some form of enhancement this has had the efect of further 
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reducing the annuity rate for normally healthy annuitants. An 
estimated 40 – 60% of DC customers might qualify for some 
form of enhancement. As yet, this is not reflected in the number 
of sales of enhanced annuities, but this is one of the areas 
the FCA intends to investigate further following its February 
2014 report and we expect the regulator to apply pressure 
on insurance companies to ensure appropriate underwriting 
techniques are used. For example, where an insurance 
company does not sell enhanced annuities, the regulator 
might insist that it makes arrangements with a second insurer 
that does. This does not mean that everyone would get a 
competitive rate, as there is no regulatory benchmark for 
enhanced rates and, as mentioned above, there has been no 
systematic comparison of rates undertaken to assess value 
for money relative to the underwritten factors and medical 
conditions. Moreover, there are no regulatory requirements for 
insurance companies to make arrangements with third parties 
that ofer the best deal. The FCA thematic review found that 
some insurers’ arrangements with third parties resulted in lower 
rates than if the consumer had approached the third party 
directly through the open market. Taking action in these areas 
is an important task for the FCA in its continued investigation 
into the annuity market.24
Finally on enhanced annuities, the term used to be 
distinguished clearly from impaired life annuities, which 
referred to individuals with very severe life-shortening medical 
conditions. If the proposed April 2015 changes go ahead, 
then many of these individuals will choose not to annuitise, 
but instead to pass on their DC pot, less income tax, to their 
dependants.25
1.3.2 The expected investment return on assets held
According to Towers Watson, the investment strategies that 
support annuity books will reflect the insurer’s annuity liabilities 
and the amount of investment risk they can aford to, or wish to 
take26. There are two main factors to consider:
  Interest rates and the yield curve: Changes in the interest 
rates priced into bonds of diferent terms to maturity (that is, 
the ‘yield curve’) are typically the biggest driver of annuity price 
changes. The sensitivity of annuity prices to changes in the 
yield curve reflects the average length of time the money is 
expected to be invested or the duration of the annuity. Insurers 
currently estimate a duration of about 11 years for individuals 
retiring at age 65. This means that a 1% fall in interest rates will 
raise the price of an annuity by 11%.
  Credit premium: Many providers invest significantly in 
corporate bonds, taking some credit risk in pursuit of additional 
returns. Changes in market conditions can impact the relative 
yields of bonds from companies with diferent credit ratings. 
This change is typically reflected in the price of an annuity, but 
not always. It depends to some extent on the reasons for the 
change as well as the overall strategy being adopted by the 
insurer. In addition, the extent of the change is not always the 
same.27
1.3.3 Business costs (the ‘load’) and objectives
As mentioned earlier, insurers will add a margin or load to the 
discounted value that it calculates for the assets it buys to 
support the annuity liabilities. These costs include running the 
business, profits and distribution, among others.28 The actual 
costs will vary significantly depending on whether the insurer 
sells only to internal (pension) customers or whether it also 
sells in the open market, in which case it will have additional 
marketing and distribution costs. The main concerns raised by 
the FCA in its 2014 report related to internal sales, where the 
evidence for eficient and fair pricing is relatively weak. 
Ideally, advisers that distribute via the open market will search 
the whole of the market (although many do not). The final 
selection is likely to be made from the top three rates quoted 
for a given pot size, specified features and medical/lifestyle 
information. At this point, the purchase is based on the best 
price available on the market. Insurers move in and out of the 
top three rates, depending on their appetite for the business, 
which will depend, in part, on how their other business areas 
are performing. If growth in these areas is lagging, insurers can 
compensate for this by temporarily ofering highly competitive 
quotes in annuities and attracting a big share of the 8–10,000 
people per week who used to buy annuities. Once they 
are back on target or have reached their desired quotas of 
annuitants of various types, they reduce their rates in order to 
become uncompetitive. This is why it is not sensible to assume 
that there are ‘leading annuity providers’ who will always be 
competitive for a particular pot size. In practice, even among 
the 12 insurers that operate in the open market, there could 
be a 20% diference between the top and bottom rate. The 
diferential between the lowest internal rate and the highest 
external rate can be much greater.29
1.3.4 LTA features and the impact of the rate
The most common type of LTA purchased pays a level income 
for a single life. Extra protection, for example, inflation-linking 
and/or a partner’s pension (via a joint life annuity), comes at a 
price, which means that the annuity rate will be lower than that 
for the single level benchmark. The FCA February 2014 report 
said that only 5% of annuities sold are inflation-linked. The most 
likely explanation for such a small market share is that inflation-
proofing typically reduces the starting income by about 
one-third relative to the level annuity rate. DC customers might 
place more emphasis on the initial level of income, rather than 
consider the long-term risks from inflation.
The main features include:
  Guarantee period: the income can be guaranteed for five 
or 10 years, which means that it continues to be paid to your 
estate/dependants if you die before the period ends. A variation 
on this feature is a ‘value protected’ annuity, where the balance 
of the fund, less income received to date, is paid to the estate. 
Guarantees come at a cost and so reduce the annuity rate, but 
the cost can be very modest, e.g. just 1-2%. Most annuities are 
bought with a five-year guarantee.
  Increasing income: a level annuity pays the same annual 
income for as long as the annuitant lives. It is possible to buy 
indexed annuities where the increase is linked to increases 
in the retail price index (RPI) or the limited price index (RPI 
capped at 2.5% or 5% inflation), or escalating annuities where 
the income increases by a fixed percentage, e.g. 3%, each year, 
irrespective of actual changes in inflation. As mentioned above, 
indexation is one of the most expensive features to purchase 
and can reduce the initial income by up to one-third relative to 
the level rate.
  Partner’s pension: income from a single life annuity stops 
when the annuitant dies. A joint life annuity continues the 
income (at 100%, two-thirds, or 50%) to the annuitant’s partner 
until he/she dies. The cost will depend on the level of the 
partner’s income selected and the partner’s age and health.
  Payment frequency: income can be paid monthly, quarterly, 
every six months, or annually; in advance or in arrears  
(i.e. where the first payment is made at the end of the selected 
payment frequency). Less frequent payments and payments  
in arrears can increase the annuity rate slightly.
1.3.5 The LTA ‘return’ and ‘money’s worth’ 
Articles in the press usually treat the LTA as an investment, even 
though it is an insurance policy that guarantees to pay out so 
long as the policyholder remains alive. In fact, if it were treated 
as an investment for the purposes of regulated financial advice, 
it would be classified as high risk, since if the purchaser died 
within hours of concluding the purchase, the entire investment 
would be lost (if the annuity was single life with no guarantees). 
The same, of course, holds with the state pension or a DB 
pension, but people do not seem to see this comparison. This 
confusion between insurance and investment only seems to 
hold in a DC environment where individuals are encouraged to 
focus on their annual return and accruing fund size during the 
whole accumulation process. It is natural for them to consider 
annuities using the same investment frame, especially when it 
is not clear why an investment is also an insurance policy. 
Unfortunately, the only way really to assess the value for 
money of an annuity is after death. Nevertheless, we can look 
at the size of the premium (the fund) relative to the annuity rate 
and average mortality assumptions, although we do not know 
the particular mortality table used by a particular insurance 
24FCA, 2014, Thematic Review of Annuities. 25See Towers Watson’s budget impacts briefing on this and other points – http://www.towerswatson.com/en-GB/
Insights/IC-Types/Ad-hoc-Point-of-View/2014/04/UK-Budget-Impacts-2014. 26Tower’s Watson’s, 2013, Pre-Retorement Investing. 27An additional factor is the 
illiquidity premium on bonds that do not trade. 28Where insurers reinsure their risks, this will be an additional cost. 29See the ABI’s ‘annuity window’, https://www.
abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Products/Pensions/Retirement-and-your-pension/Annuity-rates/About-the-annuity-window frequently.
company when it sets its annuity rate.
The Money Advice Service (MAS) shows the top six OMO 
quotations.30 
Example 1: £15,000: 5 year guarantee, level, male single life, 
age 65, paid monthly in advance
Annual income: £885.36 (highest), £764.40 (lowest), implying 
annuity rates in the range 5.10% - 5.90% and a pay-back period 
in the range 16.9 – 19.6 years
Example 2: £100,000: 5 year guarantee, level, male single life, 
age 65, paid monthly in advance
Annual income: £6,214.56 (highest), £5,566.44 (lowest), 
implying annuity rates in the range 5.57% – 6.21% and a pay-
back period in the range 16.1 – 18 years
At the time of these quotes, the yield on 25-year gilts was 
3.6%. This suggests that the average annual mortality premium 
(or drag) built into the best quotes were 2.3% (for a £15,000 
premium) and 2.6% (for a £100,000 premium). However, it is hard 
to assess whether these represent good value without having 
access to individual insurance company assumptions.  
We suggest that this is a task for the FCA’s competition review. 
Dr Edmund Cannon and Professor Ian Tonks have published 
a number of reports on annuities and their ‘money’s worth’.31
An annuity’s money’s worth indicates the value for money by 
showing the proportion of the premium (i.e., the value of the 
DC fund) that is distributed as the annuitant’s income and the 
proportion that is retained by the insurance company. The 
most recent report notes:32
“As a regulated industry, each life assurer must declare the 
actuarial assumptions used to value its liabilities, by comparing 
the mortalities used in its own calculations with the mortalities 
in the benchmark tables produced by the Institute of Actuaries’ 
Continuous Mortality Investigation. The CMI collects data from 
all of the major life assurers, aggregates and anonymises it and 
then analyses the pooled data. So the CMI tables of mortality 
approximate to the average mortalities across the whole 
industry. The figures presented in life assurers’ FSA returns are 
then compared to this average.
[The findings show that] for ages greater than 68, every life 
assurer assumes lower mortality rates than the benchmark 
[i.e., that the annuitant will live longer]. Some of the variation 
in assumptions between companies must be due to genuine 
variations in mortality of the annuitants, but it is obviously 
impossible that every company has lower mortality than the 
average, represented by the benchmark. This is prima facie 
evidence that firms are building some allowance for mortality 
risk into their valuations.”
1.4 Conclusion
Clearly it is no easy task for the FCA to judge whether annuities 
are being appropriately priced and ofer good value for money. 
  
Section 1 Section 1
30http://pluto.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/annuities. Interestingly, MAS does not provide indicative quotes for pots worth less than £10,000. Date: 13 March 2014. 
31e.g. Cannon and Tonks, 2013, Cohort Mortality Risk or Adverse Selection in the UK Annuity Market; Cannon and Tonks, 2011, Money’s Worth of Pension 
Annuities. 32Cannon and Tonks, 2013, Cohort Mortality Risk or Adverse Selection in the UK Annuity Market; Cannon and Tonks, 2011, Money’s Worth of Pension 
Annuities. 
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current DC retirement 
income alternatives 
to annuities
In this section, we examine the current alternatives to LTAs. 
We estimate that taken as a whole (but excluding ‘enhanced’ 
annuities, as these are a sub-set of LTAs), these alternatives 
currently account for at most 10% of the DC pots used for 
decumulation each year. We argue that, while at a conceptual 
level several of these products are rational in relation to their 
stated purpose, they are not necessarily a sensible choice for all 
customers, due to the investment risks and costs, which often 
are not fully understood by DC customers. 
We would urge the FCA to include drawdown in particular 
into its review of the annuity market. Following the 2014 Budget, 
drawdown is expected to become a mass-market product and it 
is vital that the regulators investigate the product range together 
with the investment and longevity risks. 
It is not clear what the future holds for the other LTA 
alternatives, but it is likely that at least some of these will wither 
on the vine. Enhanced annuities, however, will continue to be a 
crucial feature of the market. In 2014-15, and, in particular, from 
April 2015 (assuming the government’s proposals pass into law), 
for many people the LTA will be a later-life purchase, when full 
underwriting in a competitive open market is essential.
2.1 Enhanced annuities 
Enhanced rates take into account health factors (a heart 
condition, diabetes, etc) and lifestyle factors (obesity, smoking, 
etc) to assess individual mortality more accurately. Where 
a range of factors apply and, where one or more of these is 
significant, the annuitant might receive an annuity rate that is 
20-40% higher relative to the rate that would be ofered to an 
individual in good health, particularly where the open market 
option is used to identify the best rate (see Table 1). 
Enhanced annuities form a sub-set of LTAs, but we discuss 
them here because the rapid increase in individual underwriting 
over the past eight years is changing the market to the extent 
that the original concept of a single risk pool for LTAs has virtually 
disappeared – an important reason why in Section 3 we argue 
that there needs to be better asset management alternatives for 
those DC customers in good health in the early years of their 
retirement. 
As we discussed in Section 1, until comparatively recently, 
insurance companies operated a single risk pool for their LTA 
customers, where healthy and unhealthy lives were combined 
and the risks shared. The premiums of those who died early 
would subsidise the continuing incomes of those who were 
longer-lived. An estimated 40-60% of the population is likely to 
qualify for some form of enhancement; even if it is only minor, 
it might add a few percent to the rate. As sales of enhanced 
annuities rise and more unhealthy lives are extracted from the 
risk pool, the remaining healthy lives will face the prospect of 
lower rates, since insurers will assume these annuitants will enjoy 
longer lives. It will also now be a voluntary annuity, rather than 
Table 1: Example of enhanced annuity rates: £100,000 fund*
Healthy: worst rate £ 5,141
Healthy: best rate £ 6,140
Impaired, smoker £ 6,862
Impaired, smoker and obesity £ 6,910.68
Impaired, very ill, heart attack** £ 7,014.12
Impaired, very ill health, cancer*** £ 7,301.52
Notes: *Age 65, single life, no escalation, paid monthly in arrears, 5-year guarantee
**2 Heart Attacks in last 1-3 years, surgery & 1-2 daily ongoing medications
*** Lung Cancer diag. 6 months - 1 year treated with chemo and radiotherapy, only 
local tumour growth
Source: MGM Advantage/Aon Hewitt 2013, provided by Annuity Direct
Insurers do need to build in a prudent mortality bufer into 
their pricing models, given that they are writing annuities for 
individuals who might live for 30 years or more.  Underwriters 
of mortality risk pay very close attention to medical advances, 
such as genomic medicine – also known as personalised 
or stratified medicine because they are selected to suit an 
individual’s genomic profile and therefore can extend the 
lifespan in life-shortening conditions and with fewer side 
efects.33 The impact on life expectancy of this type of medical 
advance could be as significant as the impact of the discovery 
of germ theory in the nineteenth century, which led to the 
introduction of vaccines and the discovery of antibiotics.  
However, the mortality bufer is only part of the load that 
insurers add to the modelled annuity price to cover items such 
as administration and profit. The question that needs to be 
answered is this: ‘is the profit margin built into the annuity price 
excessive in relation to the capital the insurer needs to allocate 
to support its annuity business?’
This is one of the reasons why LTAs might not be suitable 
for normally healthy individuals with DC pension pots at the 
point of retirement if they have adequate alternative sources 
of income in the form of say a DB pension or a state pension. 
This might cover around 20% of annuitants. We continue this 
discussion in Section 3, while in the next section we consider 
the current alternatives to the LTA.
33Genomic medicine harnesses the predictive power of patients’ genomes and the products of those genomes, in order to identify individuals at risk of disease 
and to create smarter, more effective and personalised treatments for those who already suffer from a life-shortening condition. See http://www.jax.org/ct/
genomics.html and http://www.genome.duke.edu/research/genomic-medicine/. See https://www.alliancebernstein.com/Research-Publications/CMA-created-
content/Investments_US/Instrumentation/RWP_MolecularMedicine_ExecSummary.pdf.
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a pension annuity and, as such, will be more expensive, since 
voluntary annuitants live longer than the population average.
The changes to the LTA risk pool appear to be irreversible 
in the retail market and therefore it is essential that all DC 
customers complete medical questionnaires. The loss of 
potential enhancements was one of the biggest issues the FCA 
identified in its recent report34.
2.1.1 Underwriting techniques
Enhanced annuities initially were based on postcode, since this 
helps to identify the member’s socio-economic status, and on 
occupation (white collar vs. blue collar, etc), since this helps to 
identify occupation-related health conditions. The insurer might 
also take into account the pot size, on the assumption that 
‘wealth-equals-health’.
A Pensions Institute report, published in 2013, noted that 
underwriting techniques are changing rapidly and becoming 
more sophisticated.35 In most cases, underwriting data are 
captured via the annuity adviser or insurance company’s 
website, but it might also require a phone interview. In certain 
circumstances – for example where the medical condition is 
serious and/or complex – a general practitioner’s (GP’s) report will 
be requested by the insurance company. 
The underwriting process might consist of 10 simple 
questions (known as ‘underwriting light’ – see Table 2) or a more 
detailed questionnaire that asks for further information about the 
conditions indicated, so that the insurance company can better 
assess the annuitant’s mortality (‘deep underwriting’ – see Table 
3). For example, the underwriting-light questionnaire might ask 
if the applicant has diabetes mellitus. Deep underwriting will ask 
further questions, including precise details about the medication.  
The former process leads to enhanced rates based on average 
mortality experience; the latter is personalised and therefore, it is 
argued, can lead to a higher rate.
2.2 Short- or fixed-term  
annuities (FTAs)
Short-term or fixed-term annuities are written under income 
drawdown rules and the product is classed as an investment 
within a drawdown plan (see Section 2.5 below). This means the 
FTA could be a single arrangement whereby the whole of the 
DC pot is used as part of a drawdown portfolio that also includes 
investment funds. We understand the product is usually sold on 
a non-advised basis. Typical commission is about 2% of the fund.
While products vary, the conventional FTA provides income 
payments for a set number of years, up to a maximum of five 
or six. The annual income is between zero and the maximum 
permitted by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) 
which, before the Budget was announced, was 120% of a single 
life level annuity.  The premium might be invested in a short-term 
gilts fund, but some products link the income level to a fund or 
index performance. As with LTAs, most sales of FTAs are for a 
level single life, but the policy can be set up on a joint life basis 
Table 2: Example of an ‘underwriting light’ questionnaire
1. What is your height?
2. What is your weight?
3. Have you smoked 10 or more manufactured cigarettes per 
day for the past 10 years?
4. Have you smoked 3oz/85g or more of rolling tobacco per 
week for the past 10 years?
5. Have you been diagnosed with high blood pressure, 
requiring ongoing medication?
6. Have you had a heart attack requiring hospital admission?
7. Have you been diagnosed with diabetes requiring insulin or 
tablet treatment?
8. Have you sufered a stroke (CVA), excluding mini-strokes 
(TIAs)?
9. Have you been diagnosed with angina requiring ongoing 
medication?
10. Have you been diagnosed with cancer (excluding skin 
cancer and benign tumours) requiring surgery, chemotherapy 
or radiotherapy?
and with a guaranteed income period or value-protection option 
to provide death benefits, which are taxed at 55%. 
At the end of the term, the insurer returns a percentage of 
the original premium as a maturity value, e.g. 80% after five 
years – the amount will depend on the level of income taken. 
The maturity value must be used to continue DC decumulation, 
for example, by purchasing another FTA, an LTA, or by using 
drawdown. 
The advantages of the FTA, like income drawdown, include 
the deferment of making the LTA purchase, while still receiving a 
regular income. One very specific use, for example, is where the 
FTA provides a bridging pension for an individual who has a DC 
pot that matures at age 60 and a good DB pension that begins 
at age 65. In this case, it can make sense to take the maximum 
income permitted from the FTA. 
However, the main attraction promoted by providers is that 
when the fixed term ends, annuity rates might have  improved 
and/or the individual’s health might have deteriorated, in which 
case he or she might qualify for a higher LTA rate than would 
have been the case previously. However, the opposite might also 
occur, so the individual needs to be aware of the risks associated 
with uncertain future annuity rates (interest rate risk) and the 
individual’s future state of health (morbidity risk). We argue that 
these are very significant risks and that, from an individual’s 
perspective, they are not so much unknown as unknowable. 
There is a danger that this product confers a potentially 
misleading sense of psychological security. In a practical sense, 
it is not ‘safe’ in terms of protecting future income sustainability. 
Although it keeps the capital secure for a short period, it has a 
similar chance of delivering a lower future income as income 
drawdown from a balanced investment fund and unless 
invested in one of the less-common growth funds, has no upside 
potential. Importantly, there is no guarantee of what the income 
will be in five years’ time, when it is necessary to reinvest the 
maturity value. This is a significant risk for a low-income investor, 
especially if they are also a conservative investor. Therefore we 
would argue that fixed-term annuities might be more accurately 
described as short-term income drawdown. It will be important 
for the promotion of these products to avoid the use of the 
word ‘guarantee’, unless the precise nature of this ‘guarantee’ is 
explained clearly.
Moreover, the combination of income and return of fund 
can vary and we were told that some providers emphasise the 
higher income at the expense of maturity value. One problem 
that can arise is when the income level is reviewed after three 
years in relation to maximum GAD rates (the same rule applies to 
drawdown at present). If the income taken at the outset is at the 
maximum, the fund returned at the end of the term will be lower 
than if a lower income had been taken. If at this time, interest 
rates are lower and less favourable mortality assumptions 
are being used to price new annuities, then the buyer of the 
FTA could end up with a lower income than if a LTA had been 
purchased from the start. We were informed that there needs to 
be a 10% increase in the prevailing annuity rate for the annuitant 
to break even, when compared with the purchase of an LTA 
from the outset. One adviser who ran a series of quotations for 
us showed that, assuming no changes in health, the income that 
could be purchased after five years is likely to be significantly 
lower. Reinvestment risk is therefore the main concern with this 
product, as well as the additional charges and either the new 
fee for advice or the new commission where the replacement 
annuity is purchased via a non-advice service. 
The product has been available for five years now and 
therefore the FCA could examine the income levels, maturity 
values and the income that could be achieved by purchasing an 
LTA rather than a series of FTAs. 
2.3 Phased annuity purchase 
Under phased annuity purchase, the DC pot – including tax-free 
cash – is segmented. Each year, one segment of the fund is 
used to buy an annuity, while the tax-free cash attached to each 
segment is used to provide the income in the early years and to 
boost it in the later years.
The perceived advantage of this strategy is that it hedges 
annuity rate risk, because the single point of purchase is 
converted in a series of purchases over a period of years so 
that the purchaser develops a portfolio of annuities of diferent 
commencement dates that relate to diferences in age and 
health and diferent prevailing interest rates. 
The disadvantages include the use of the tax-free cash to 
provide income (assuming an income is required, which might 
not be the case if the individual continues in part-time work, 
for example), interest-rate risk, and the cost of making multiple 
purchases. 
2.4 Investment-backed annuities (IBAs)
This type of annuity (also known as ‘investment-linked’), which 
accounts for about 5% of total annuities sold, invests the 
premium in one or more funds. There are two types: with-profits 
annuities and unit-linked (or flexible) annuities.  As the name 
suggests, the former invests in a with-profits fund; the latter 
invests in the annuitant’s choice of a range of funds, which can 
be actively or passively (indexed) managed. The income, which 
is set at the outset with reference to the prevailing annuity rate 
and assumed investment return, might fluctuate significantly, 
depending on the choice of fund. On average over the long run, 
a higher income should be achieved by an IBA which invests in 
growth assets compared with a LTA which invests in bonds.
IBAs ofer a similar range of features to the LTA, such as 
single or joint life, a guaranteed period, and diferent payment 
frequencies. We understand that enhanced terms can apply. 
Some providers set a guaranteed floor below which the income 
will not fall, which might be about 50-55% of the LTA rate at the 
time of purchase. As an annuity, a mortality premium is built 
into the return, although this is likely to be smaller than with 
a LTA because in general it is only the wealthier annuitants 
who buy the product (the wealth-equals-health point made in 
Section 1).
While favoured by some experts, due to the potential for 
income growth, there are important considerations that might 
Source: Pensions Institute, ‘A healthier way to de-risk’, February 2013
Source: Annuity Direct, http://www.annuitydirect.co.uk/ 
Table 3: Example of (a section from) a ‘deep underwriting’ 
questionnaire (smoker)
1.  Have you been a regular daily smoker for the last 10 years?
2. If you are a regular smoker, please indicate the average daily  
 level:
 a. Manufactured cigarettes
 b. Cigars
3.  If you are a regular smoker, please indicate the average   
 weekly level:
 a. Rolling tobacco
         i. Ozs, or
         ii. Gms 
 b. Pipe tobacco
         i. Ozs, or
         ii. Gms
4.  If you previously smoked, please advise of the years you  
 started and stopped. [Here the form asks for day, month and   
 year]
5.  How much did you smoke? [Here the form repeats Q3].
34FCA, 2014, Budget 2014 – Pension Reforms. 35Pensions Institute, 2013, A healthier way to de-risk
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make this product unsuitable for some people, in particular, the 
investment risk and the costs:
  Suitability: There is little standardisation in product 
design, which makes it very dificult to compare like with like. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the IBA is to combine the best 
features of drawdown – maintaining an investment in growth 
assets in the immediate period after retirement – with the 
best features of an annuity – providing longevity insurance. In 
principle, if it were well designed and ofered good value for 
money, the IBA would be an attractive competitor to drawdown, 
particularly if it included capital protection features which are 
currently not common. At present, however, drawdown is more 
attractive for inheritance-planning purposes, especially for high 
net worth individuals, although drawdown costs are higher 
– and we understand they can be significantly higher – than 
IBAs. It might be for this reason that certain advisers favour the 
IBA where a cautious growth fund is selected. At present, this 
might be a more cost-efective way to retain the prospect of 
income growth, especially for those who would not qualify for 
an enhanced LTA rate and who have no partner or dependants 
to consider. The IBA might also represent a suitable component 
part of a mixed portfolio of DC decumulation products.
  Cost: Annual costs are estimated at about 2% per annum, 
with a higher charge in the first year to include the cost of 
advice.  However, we were shown many examples where the 
costs were not easy to calculate.
  Investment risk: Investment risk and income risk 
are closely connected, as we show in the more detailed 
consideration of the with-profits annuity below. The perceived 
attraction of the IBA is that it will deliver a higher income over 
time than is possible with the LTA, therefore the fund must 
generate a minimum level of growth, after charges, so that 
the actual maximum income that can be drawn is higher than 
that ofered by the LTA rate that was available at the date of 
purchase.
2.4.1 With-profits annuities
To explore the risks of the IBA, we focus here on the with-profits 
version. It is significant to note that the with-profits market is 
generally in decline, although several providers – including 
mutual insurers – continue to ofer the fund as a general 
investment. The important point here is that the choice of 
provider and its financial strength (which indicates its ability to 
support future bonuses, among other factors) is crucial. Where 
a provider closes its with-profits book to new business, the 
investment strategy will become more cautious as the book 
matures. There is also a very real danger that the book could be 
sold to a consolidator, which might not have a strong reputation 
for treating customers fairly (TCF), as defined by the FCA. 
With-profits funds invest in a range of asset classes, for 
example, bonds, property and equities. The declared annual 
bonus is set to provide a smoothed – generally growing – 
income from the fund, unlike the income from a unit-linked fund 
which is much more volatile since the value of the units directly 
reflects the value of the underlying fund. The smoothing 
mechanism requires the holding of a reserve, with the objective 
of delivering a fairly stable income even during periods where 
the markets are volatile and falling. 
How the bonus is calculated is not at all transparent to 
customers. The initial income is set in accordance with basic 
LTA principles, but the future level of income depends on the 
level of the declared bonus, which represents the ‘return’ on 
the fund.  The annuitant – with the help of his or her adviser, 
where relevant – can increase the starting income by taking 
into account some of the likely investment growth during the 
coming year by selecting an anticipated bonus rate (ABR). 
The Retirement Academy describes the process as follows:
“The ABR can currently be anywhere between 0% and 5% 
and efectively allows a policyholder to borrow against future 
income payments. At the end of the year the anticipated 
bonus is subtracted from the annuity before adding the actual 
bonuses declared in that year. If the anticipated bonus is lower 
than the declared bonus, the annuity payments increase and 
vice versa. 
For example if you select a 4% ABR, the starting income 
will be similar to a standard level annuity. This makes sense 
because standard annuities are priced in relation to yields 
on fixed interest and this is currently about 4%. The ABR is 
efectively the yield on which the WPA [with-profits annuity] is 
priced. Whereas the yield on the standard annuity is fixed for 
the term of the annuity, the annual bonuses on WPAs change 
every year.
This means that if in year two the declared WPA bonus is 
Here the consumer can take the tax-free lump sum and leave 
the rest of the fund invested and draw an income directly 
which is taxed at the marginal rate (or indeed no income at all). 
Investors can use a personal pension or a self-invested personal 
pension (SIPP) for drawdown and can invest in one or more life 
ofice funds or unit-linked funds designed for the purpose or in 
a wide range of other assets. 
Although not a requirement, we understand that most (but 
not all) drawdown plans are sold on an advised basis. This is 
distinct from guided- or non-advice (execution-only) which is 
the most common method of purchasing annuities, particularly 
for funds worth less than £100,000. However, providers and 
advisers make drawdown available for DC customers with as 
little as £20,000 to invest, although we understand that small 
drawdown funds are often used to supplement a secure DB 
pension. 
Charges for drawdown vary considerably and will depend 
on the cost of the underlying investments, the product charges, 
and the advice. Even for a simple fund structure from a low-cost 
provider, the annual management charge might be 1% plus 
an administration fee of £250 per annum, which would cover 
the cost of income payments and income level reviews, for 
example. A more common total cost is about 2% p.a. which is 
similar to that for an investment-backed annuity. Worryingly, we 
came across cases where the charges for a SIPP package and 
advice were 4%-4.5%. There are also hidden costs, including 
bid-ofer spreads, the cost of sub-funds within the main fund, 
platform charges etc. Where an actively managed fund is 
selected, there is a risk that high turnover (churning) would 
add significantly to the total cost due to the transaction costs 
involved. A requirement for full disclosure of all costs, which is 
being discussed by industry, regulators and government, would 
help to shine a light on this murky issue.
Prior to the 2014 Budget, there were two types of drawdown 
(although the government plans to remove all restrictions with 
efect from April 2015):
  Flexible drawdown: As the name indicates, the income is 
flexible and there is no upper limit. However, flexible drawdown 
can only be used where the individual has a secure source of 
retirement income (the minimum income requirement or MIR) 
worth £20,000 per annum. This might be from a single source 
– for example a defined benefit (DB) pension scheme – or 
from a combination of sources, including a DB pension, a state 
pension in payment, and a guaranteed annuity income. The 
MIR is reviewed every five years.
  Capped drawdown: Where the individual does not 
meet the requirements for flexible drawdown, the rules link 
the maximum permitted annual income to 120% of the 
Government Actuary’s Department’s (GAD’s) annuity rate,  
which can be calculated from the GAD drawdown tables.36  
It is possible to defer taking income, as there is no minimum 
income requirement. The maximum is reviewed on a triennial 
basis to prevent those for whom the DC fund is their main 
source of retirement income from taking too much in the early 
years and leaving insuficient income for later retirement.  From 
age 75, the review is annual. The maximum income cannot 
take account of medical and lifestyle factors, so ‘enhanced 
drawdown’ is not possible.
2.5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of drawdown
The main advantages can be summarised as follows:
  Control over the investment strategy. 
  Flexibility to change the income on an annual basis (subject 
to the maximum in the case of capped drawdown). 
  Potential for higher returns over the longer term, but only if 
the fund is invested in riskier assets. 
  Death benefits: on death in drawdown, the investor’s partner 
can continue to draw an income or take it as a lump sum that is 
taxable (at 55%).
  Deferment of the annuity purchase – in theory indefinitely, 
although experts agree that in most cases the guarantees 
provided by the LTA will become attractive at some point.
The main disadvantages can be summarised as follows:
  Ill-informed decisions: the risk that the advice and guidance 
market will not provide the level of individual support required 
to ensure all consumers make well-informed decisions, for 
example, in relation to taxation and the income level.
  Longevity risk: the risk that the individual will run out of 
money before death. 
  Investment risk: the risk that investment returns will not 
outstrip costs and annuity rates appears to be quite high – 
much will depend on the costs incurred. 
  Cost: this can be an expensive arrangement and not all of 
the investment costs will be visible, for example, where the 
chosen fund invests in a range of sub-funds. There might be 
separate platform costs and on top of this, there will be the 
cost of regulated advice where used, or commission for non-
advice. We were told that total costs of 4.5% are not unusual, 
but that almost certainly the individual would assume he or 
she was paying much less. Investment risk and cost cannot be 
separated; for example, higher costs might mean that providers 
and advisers recommend inappropriately high-risk asset 
allocations in the hope of delivering a return in excess of these 
high costs.
  Annuity-conversion risk: a range of factors, including 
drawdown costs and investment returns, together with 
changes in interest rates, mortality assumptions and the 
individual’s health status, will all afect the LTA rate in the future, 
assuming the individual will buy longevity insurance at some 
point.
2.5.2 Suitability and the ‘critical yield’
In advised sales, the suitability of drawdown in relation to the 
risk-return trade-of will depend partly on the individual’s risk 
tolerance, but also on a professional assessment of the ‘Type 
36http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pensionschemes/gad-tables.htm 
Example
Assume a WPA with an ABR of 4% pays a starting 
income of £ 1,000 p.a. 
If the year 2 declared bonus is 5% the Year 2 income 
increases to £ 1,000 x [1.05 (Declared bonus) – 1.04 
(ABR)] = £1,010
However if the year 2 declared bonus is 3% the Year 2 
income decreases to  £ 1,000 x [1.03 (Declared bonus) – 
1.04 (ABR)] = £ 990
higher than the ABR the WPA income will increase, whereas if 
the bonus is lower the WPA income will fall.”
A few insurance companies have tried to launch a product 
that invests part of the premium in an LTA and part in a with-
profits annuity. However, we understand that these products 
have been withdrawn after a short period. 
2.5 Income drawdown 
The 2014 Budget changes to decumulation tax rules will have 
the most dramatic impact on the drawdown market, which will 
be transformed from a niche strategy for the wealthy, due to 
the potentially high initial and ongoing costs and investment 
risks, into a mass market product available to everyone 
whose pot is too large to take as cash under the new trivial 
commutation rules.
Drawdown does not involve the purchase of an annuity. 
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A Critical Yield’. This is the growth rate needed to provide 
and maintain an income equal to that obtainable under an 
equivalent immediate annuity. The calculation assumes that an 
income will be taken at the level of the available annuity until a 
specified age (usually 75) and at that age there will be suficient 
money in the drawdown fund to purchase an annuity equal to 
what could be bought at the point when drawdown started. 
The critical yield is the growth rate on the investment(s) 
that is required to enable the individual to draw an income 
equivalent to the LTA rate that could have been secured at the 
outset through to a specified age (usually 75). The residual fund 
must be suficient to secure the LTA rate that was available at 
the outset. Put simply, the higher the annuity rate available (for 
example, enhancements might apply), the higher the critical 
yield required.  
Unfortunately, it appears that the regulations on calculating 
the critical yield, which were introduced in 1998, are out of date 
and contain dangerous loopholes.  Where these loopholes are 
exploited, this could lead to cases of mis-selling on the basis of 
an understated investment risk. In particular, the rules do not 
specify the basis of the calculation. A revision should include 
the requirement to use top OMO rates, including top enhanced 
rates. 
Annuity Direct gave us the following explanation:
“This creates an issue in that the basis for the annuity is not 
properly defined and when RU 55 was drafted in August 1998, 
the enhanced market was not as advanced as it is today. This 
means that providers generally use their own annuity rate to 
calculate the critical yield. The result will be that, where the 
annuity rate is not competitive, the critical yield will be lower, 
resulting in the risks of drawdown being understated.”
The problem is exacerbated when a client is eligible for 
an enhanced annuity because the higher the annuity rate 
available, the higher the yield required. Our practice therefore 
is to broke the annuity in the open market – including medical 
information where appropriate – and then to use the highest 
annuity rate to calculate the Type A Critical Yield. The following 
example may help:
A client has £61,000, which he wants to use for drawdown.
The quote from the [provider’s name deleted] internal rates 
produced an annuity of £3,010 and this was used to calculate a 
Type A Critical Yield of 6.6% p.a.
We were able to obtain an enhanced annuity for the client 
amounting to £3,488. When we ran this rate through the critical 
yield quote system, the required yield increased to 7.65%p.a.
2.5.3 Pre-retirement advice and guidance on asset 
allocation
It is to be hoped that DC providers will contact customers who 
have entered, or are about to enter, the de-risking stage of 
accumulation, to let them know about their new options so that 
they do not automatically switch out of growth assets into cash 
and gilts. 
2.6 Conclusion
In this section, we have evaluated the alternatives to the LTA 
and have found significant weaknesses in each product. 
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, there 
is a very important diference between weaknesses at the 
conceptual level and weaknesses that emerge due to the 
design and distribution. This is most noticeable in the products 
that aim to fully or partially substitute an asset management 
solution for the early years of retirement for the full longevity 
insurance solution (the LTA). For example, at present, asset 
management alternatives, such as investment-backed annuities 
and income drawdown, tend to be made available only to the 
wealthy, due to the perceived investment risks and the ongoing 
charges, which can be much higher than those associated 
with a one-of annuity purchase.  In the following section, 
we consider how these asset management solutions might 
be improved through the creation of institutional/scheme 
products. 
Section 3 innovation
3.1 What is the objective of innovation?
In this report, we distinguish between what constitutes an 
efective market and what constitutes an eficient market. 
The FCA’s further investigations in 2014 aim to create an 
eficient market for decumulation, based on the current model. 
Improvements in eficiency are likely to target pricing at product 
level and introduce improvements in distribution via the OMO. 
In other words, the FCA aims to correct the lack of market 
eficiency. While this focus is crucial, it might also be described 
as backward-looking. We argue that what is also needed 
is a robust debate about what constitutes an efective DC 
decumulation market going forwards – an approach that would 
focus on radical improvements to product design and delivery 
channels. Our findings, explored in this section, lead to our key 
recommendation: the overarching goal of innovation should be 
to change the retail model for DC decumulation into a scheme-
based institutional model, both in terms of product design and 
delivery. 
We stress that, for most people, it will be necessary to buy 
a LTA at some point because the greatest risk of DC is that of 
outliving retirement savings. As discussed in Section 1, while the 
LTA is a perfect hedge for longevity risk, the return is unattractive 
for many people in the early years of retirement. This is already 
evident in the historically low annuity rates available for those 
in their late-50s and 60s who are in good health. Low returns 
also go some way towards explaining why only about 5% of 
annuitants buy inflation-linking, since it reduces the initial income 
by around one-third. This means that the current system embeds 
both low yields and massive inflation risk. 
Innovation needs to address the following four issues: 
  The optimal age to purchase longevity insurance and the 
optimal age at which the longevity insurance comes into efect
  The most efective and eficient products for deferring income 
in the period between retirement and the age at which the 
longevity insurance comes into efect
  The most efective and eficient products for providing 
income in the period between retirement and the age at which 
the longevity insurance comes into efect
  The level of income that should be drawn in relation to 
income tax (i.e., the avoidance of moving into a higher marginal 
rate band where possible) and to longevity risk (i.e., the avoidance 
of drawing a high level of income in the early years that would 
result in running out of money in later retirement should the 
individual live longer than expected).
A retirement period of 20 – 30 years can be divided into 
three phases. A typical pattern might be early retirement 
(active, healthy), mid-retirement (more sedentary), and late-
retirement (ill-health/care requirements). For the purpose of DC 
decumulation, we also believe it is helpful to consider the period 
prior to the purchase of longevity insurance and the period after 
the purchase. As a rough guide, we classify those who are aged 
between 55 and 70 – 75, in good health, and have dependants as 
being in the pre-longevity insurance stage of their retirement.37 
At some point between age 70 and age 80, it will switch 
between income drawdown and a LTA, since the implied 
return on a LTA at these ages – as a result of the high mortality 
premium built into their return at these ages – exceeds any 
realistic return available in the financial markets.
With reference to the second and third points, an 
appropriate deferment and drawdown product that can be 
integrated into auto-enrolment might be described as one that:
  Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing
  Delivers a reasonably reliable income stream (i.e. with 
minimal fluctuations)
  Maintains the purchasing power of the fund
  Ofers the flexibility to purchase the LTA at any time (or at 
regular predetermined intervals to hedge interest rate and 
mortality risk)
  Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost
  Requires minimal consumer engagement
  Benefits from a low-cost delivery system
We now consider the most efective and eficient products 
for providing income in the period between retirement and the 
purchase of longevity insurance
3.2 Scheme and institutional innovation
3.2.1 Scheme drawdown
Scheme drawdown is emerging as an institutional asset 
management solution to the decumulation needs of DC 
customers in early retirement. The first of these institutional 
drawdown products is expected to be launched this year.
37We do not address the needs of late retirement, when long-term care may be required. This is because, at present, most DC pots are too small to accommodate 
LTC planning. In due course, this will become an important problem to solve in association with the pension problem. 
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Scheme drawdown aims to deliver a low-cost and flexible 
drawdown facility, for example, through target date funds 
(TDFs) that span the later years of accumulation and the early 
years of decumulation. The TDF is an investment strategy 
designed for DC default funds (accumulation), whereby the 
scheme establishes a range of TDFs, each with its own glide 
path. This might involve a TDF for each possible retirement 
date, or there might be a single TDF for members who plan 
(or are expected) to retire within a given five-year window. In 
many respects, it is a natural extension of the default fund 
used by modern multi-trust, multi-employer schemes for the 
auto-enrolment accumulation stage.  We also argue that it 
is a natural extension of the trustees’ governance role and 
fiduciary duties, which at present end very abruptly and, in 
our view, prematurely, when members are steered towards 
the purchase of LTAs at the point of retirement. Under scheme 
drawdown, the trustees would be responsible for governance, 
which would include the selection of the asset manager(s) and 
administration of payments into retired member accounts. 
This governance structure would avoid the need to rely on 
individual employers. NEST has hinted that it might ofer 
scheme drawdown in future.  We encountered a number 
of asset managers that are developing this strategy and 
AllianceBernstein, which provides target date funds for several 
new auto-enrolment schemes, said it is close to launching its 
Retirement Bridge product to schemes in the mass market.  
We were not given any specific details by asset managers, 
due to the sensitivity of their development and pre-launch 
planning, but we assume that the maximum income might still 
be linked to GAD rates, as a precaution to prevent depleting 
the fund, although it would be reviewed annually (rather than 
every three years) because investors might need to pull out 
at any point to purchase a LTA. The cap on maximum income 
might be set at a slightly lower level than the GAD maximum – 
e.g., 5-10% lower – in order to provide a ‘bufer’ or reserve. This 
would enable the fund to smooth the income payments when 
markets are volatile and also to return funds to members who 
decide the time is right to make an annuity purchase. 
Income would be generated partly from the investment 
yield and partly from a drawdown of capital (i.e., the pension 
pot). For example, if the aim were to deliver a maximum income 
of 6%, this might comprise 3.5% from the yield and 2.5% from 
capital (i.e., the initial premium).  Funds are likely to be low-
risk and largely bond-based, but might also include a modest 
allocation to growth assets in order to help preserve the 
annuity-purchasing power of the members’ funds. 
The regulation of scheme drawdown will be of keen interest 
to trustees and asset managers, among others. No doubt TPR 
would need to consider carefully the fund objectives, volatility 
and the smoothing mechanism, among other features. The 
regulator would also have to settle the question of advice vs. 
guidance. 
We were told that there would be no need for individual 
advice with this type of arrangement because it is an income-
paying fund and administration facility ofered by the scheme 
trustees. Even if this is the case, it will be necessary for trustees 
to provide clear member communications and much will 
depend on whether scheme drawdown is the default or an 
option. Where it is the default for the early years of retirement 
there would need to be some form of screening process to 
ensure members for whom the strategy is not suitable are 
ofered alternative arrangements, e.g., a single person with no 
dependants who is in poor health would probably be better 
of with an enhanced annuity. Where it is not the default, a 
professional decumulation service appointed and monitored 
by the trustees could steer members towards the most 
appropriate decision, in which case the scheme drawdown 
fund would be one of the available options. 
The attraction of scheme drawdown is that it has the 
potential to be much cheaper and deliver more consistent 
results than conventional drawdown, due to economies 
of scale, trustee oversight, and the use of a well-designed 
institutionally managed fund. Scheme drawdown would also be 
more flexible than the FTA because members would be able to 
purchase an LTA at any time or at designated regular intervals, 
depending on the scheme rules. 
We did not have access to the pricing of products likely to 
be launched in 2014-2015, but we estimate that the member 
charge might be in the region of 0.6% to 1%. The breakdown 
for a member charge of 0.6% might be 40bps for the fund 
management and 20bps for the administration of payments  
to individual accounts.  
Under the above scenario, scheme drawdown could be used 
as a relatively short-term decumulation solution. This would 
provide members with a breathing space before purchasing the 
LTA, which might be a more efective and eficient alternative to 
the proposal for a post-LTA sale cooling-ofer period (see below). 
It might also be used for a longer period during the early stage 
of retirement. 
Finally, trustees will need to reconsider the asset allocation 
of their glide path during the de-risking phase pre-retirement, 
since at present it aims to conclude with a fund that is 25% in 
cash, to hedge the tax-free cash element, and 75% in gilts, to 
hedge annuity rates. This would no longer be appropriate for 
members who go into drawdown. This point applies irrespective 
of whether the trustees intend to ofer scheme drawdown.
3.2.2 Institutional annuitisation 
This concept is already widely used in the DB annuity bulk 
buy-out market, where economies of scale can benefit 
scheme members as well as the DB scheme (i.e., through an 
improvement to its funding level and its risk profile relative 
to liabilities).  The idea is for an insurance company to 
underwrite the longevity risks, relative to a guaranteed lifetime 
income, presented by a cohort of retirees. There would be a 
requirement for underwriting, but it is possible that this could 
be simplified if there were common characteristics in the 
cohort, for example, in relation to the industry in which they 
worked (occupational health risk) and/or in the area in which 
they lived (‘postcode’ socio-economic underwriting).
If this model could be developed for the DC auto-enrolment 
market, it could deliver better value for money for retirees, 
and it might be implemented via a national clearing house, for 
example, to ensure universal access. It might also be ofered 
directly by the large-scale DC schemes, once they have 
achieved the necessary critical mass, and as a natural extension 
of scheme drawdown. 
A variation on this is the pooled annuitisation operating in 
the Swedish Premier Pension System (PPM).  Here each cohort 
of retirees completely ‘self-annuitises’.  The starting annuity rate 
is set on the basis of the latest available mortality projection 
and interest rates. However, the annuity is rebased annually 
in the light of revised mortality projections and returns. This 
means that the annuity can rise and fall over time. The idea is to 
avoid intergenerational cross-subsidies.
3.2.3 Defined Ambition (DA) and Collective  
DC Schemes (CDC)
Defined ambition (DA) is the description the government uses 
for a range of proposals for workplace pension schemes that 
combine some of the risk-sharing benefits of DB, but which 
impose zero or limited liabilities on the sponsoring employer.  
The aims are to provide more certainty for members than a 
typical DC scheme, but ensure less cost volatility for sponsors 
of DB schemes than is the case with the traditional model. 
The DA proposals for DB schemes (‘DB-light’) for future 
accrual involve replacing the statutory indexation of pensions 
in payment with conditional indexation (which will depend on 
the scheme’s funding position), change the scheme’s normal 
pension age in line with changes in longevity assumptions, 
and automatically convert benefits to a DC pension when a 
member leaves the scheme, with the choice between a cash 
equivalent transfer value and full buy-out.
The DA proposals for DC schemes (‘DC-heavy’) for future 
accrual include (note: none of these options involves any risk to 
employer):
  Money back guarantee (MBG) which ensures members 
receive the same amount that they paid in (i.e., they get at least 
their money back).
  Capital and investment return guarantees (CIRG) which 
ensure that members receive back their contributions plus a 
minimum investment return.
  Retirement income insurance (RII) which uses part of the 
member’s fund to purchase insurance that insures a minimum 
level of income which is expected to grow every year as further 
insurance is purchased. At retirement the insurance is triggered 
if the member lives long enough to exhaust their fund. 
  Pension income builder (PIB) which uses part of 
contributions to purchase a deferred annuity which provides 
a minimum pension in respect of that year. The rest of the 
contribution goes to a common pooled fund that is invested 
in riskier assets and is used to generate growth and pay 
conditional indexation. The deferred annuity can be bought 
from an insurer or provided from within the fund. 
  Collective defined contribution schemes (CDC) which we 
discuss below.
The PIB is the strategy used in ATP, the largest pension fund 
in Denmark. Part of each contribution into the scheme is used 
to buy a deferred annuity which is payable from retirement. The 
level of income secured depends on the level of interest rates 
at the time and so will fluctuate from year to year. The rest of 
the contribution is invested in growth assets which allows for 
the possibility of pension increases and also provides a bufer 
against increases in life expectancy.  The fund accrued with 
these remaining contributions could be used for drawdown 
during the initial phase of retirement, thereby enhancing the 
income from the deferred annuities (once they start paying). 
Part of the fund could also be used to buy ALDAs (see Section 
3.3.1) which would add to the income in late retirement.
This is an interesting strategy which fully integrates the 
accumulation and decumulation stages. It has the advantage 
of expressing the benefit in terms of a future income – which 
participants are more likely to understand – rather than a pot 
size – which most participants find very dificult to convert into 
an income equivalent. There are, however, some disadvantages. 
First, deferred annuities typically have a specific date on which 
they start to make payments. This suggests that individuals 
would need to have a fairly clear idea about the date on 
which they are planning to retire when they start to purchase 
deferred annuities in say their early 20s.  Standard deferred 
annuities give little flexibility to change this date. A very large 
fund like ATP might be able to accommodate a certain amount 
of flexibility, but a small scheme might not be able to do this. 
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Second, deferred annuities purchased through insurance 
companies can be expensive on account of the amount of 
capital the regulator requires the insurer to post. This is because 
of the potential large changes in life expectancy that might 
occur over the 40 or so years of accumulation.  Again a fund 
the size of APT might be able to ofer these annuities internally, 
but if it does underestimate increases in life expectancy, it is the 
next generation of members who will be subsidising the retired 
generation.
The most relevant proposal for the purposes of the current 
report is CDC. Here the contributions of the employer and 
employees would be fixed and the risks remain with the 
members, as per the current system. The key diference is 
that risks are shared collectively between the members (via 
intergenerational transfers) and retirement benefits are adjusted 
pre- and post-retirement according to the fund’s performance 
(comparing the funding level relative to benefits promised).  
Benefits might rise, therefore, but they also might fall, although 
the arrangement would be designed to minimise fluctuations. 
At retirement, the member would receive the pension income 
directly from the scheme fund.
A form of CDC is used in the Netherlands, where it has been 
regarded as highly successful, in spite of recent reductions to 
pensions. However, the Netherlands benefits from a greater 
sense of social solidarity than does the UK with a collective 
approach to pension provision that brings together employers 
and unions as ‘social partners’ and supports a small number 
of very large industry-wide schemes where scale economies 
are fully exploited. A similar arrangement operates in Denmark. 
Even so, recent criticisms of the CDC model have begun to 
highlight the potential unfairness of the intergenerational risk 
sharing aspect of the model which has turned out to be more 
about ‘borrowing from’ the next cohort of members rather than 
sharing risks with them. 
It is not clear if CDC would work in the UK’s very diferent 
private-sector labour market where the idea of social solidarity 
is quite diferent. Intergenerational transfer of risk in the UK 
began to go badly wrong in the with-profits market in the 
1990s and there are still concerns about the associated opacity 
of actuarial discretion. Overcoming these weaknesses would 
require very robust independent governance.
CDC relies on schemes that benefit from scale and in which 
there is stability of membership.38 Auto-enrolment is likely to 
result in a small number – possibly as few as five or six – large-
scale multi-employer multi-trust schemes, so this suggests 
that the former is possible. However, the latter – stability of 
membership – is far less certain. 
38One think-tank has claimed that CDC appropriately designed could deliver pensions that are 10-25% higher than under the pure DC system, which at present 
relies on the retail market for decumulation RSA, 2013, Collective Pensions in the UK; RSA, 2012, collective Pensions in the UK; see also DWP, 2009, Modelling 
Collective Defined Contribution Schemes. 39A 401(k) is an employer-sponsored pension scheme (‘plan’ in the US), similar in some ways to a group personal 
pension in the UK. It is named after the section of the tax code that governs the plans, introduced in the 1980s.
3.3 Retail annuity product innovation
3.3.1 Advanced life deferred annuities
The 2014 Budget overhaul of the DC decumulation tax rules, 
and in particular the new regime proposed for April 2015, will – 
or certainly should – focus attention on the value of the LTA as 
an insurance product that provides a perfect longevity hedge 
for pensioners in later retirement, when insurance, rather than 
investment, is more appropriate. Such a focus would recognise 
that the real weakness in the DC model is the long tail of 
longevity risk that individuals must bear.
In the US, one form of DC decumulation for those with 401(k) 
pension plans39 is to split the fund, say, 70/30, between a 
drawdown product and a deferred annuity product.  The 
former, known as a ‘rollover’ or income retirement account 
(IRA), operates in a similar way to income drawdown. The latter, 
known as an advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA, also known 
in the US as longevity insurance), begins to pay out at a date 
in very late retirement, for example age 85, if the DC customer 
survives to that age.  ALDAs are also available in Chile, although 
they are not yet available in the UK.
The basic ALDA is pure insurance: it only pays out if the 
insured individual lives until the specified age. It is possible to 
buy certain features, which reduce the rate, e.g.: 
  Death benefit: if the annuitant dies before the start of 
payments, the insurance company returns the value of the fund 
and, in some cases, adds an amount for interest. 
  Cash refund: if the annuitant dies after payments 
commence, the balance of the fund is paid to his or her 
beneficiaries.   
  Early payment: this can be arranged with some providers, 
for example where the annuitant has to go into a nursing home. 
This element is also known as a life-care or immediate needs 
annuity.
While this combination of drawdown and tail-end longevity 
insurance sounds attractive, the standard ALDA is a level 
annuity, so the impact of inflation is likely to be significant by 
the time the annuitant begins to draw the income. 
3.3.2 Extreme-inflation protection
At present, due to the approximate one-third reduction in initial 
income, only about 5% of people who buy a LTA purchase 
inflation-proofing. We were told that it would be possible to 
design a cheaper form of inflation-proofing which aims to 
match RPI more closely and which would provide a hedge 
against extreme inflation shocks (a feature described as an 
‘inflation-kicker’).  
The concept, which has yet to come to market, is based on 
the assumption that most retirees can tolerate a limited amount 
of inflation risk. Therefore, if inflation were below 3%, the annuity 
income might fall slightly. If it were exactly 3%, there would be 
no change. Above this figure, the income would increase.40  
This is an interesting idea and quite diferent from the two 
existing methods of capping the cost of inflation protection. 
The first is to buy a fixed rate of escalation, e.g. 3% per annum. 
The problem with this is that the annuitant receives the 
increase irrespective of actual inflation rates, so it could be more 
or less than is needed to keep pace. Due to the low-interest rate 
environment, 3% indexation is not significantly cheaper than 
full RPI. The main problem with a fixed rate of escalation is that 
it ofers no protection in the event of soaring inflation, such as 
that experienced in the 1970s. With quantitative easing about 
to unwind, it would be impossible to rule out an inflation spike 
over the next 20 or 30 years.
The second method is limited price indexation (LPI). This 
matches RPI, but only up to a limit of 2.5 or 5%. So, like fixed 
escalation at 3%, it does not protect against a future inflation 
spike. 
3.3.3 LTA 12-month cooling-of period
The government had a pre-Budget proposal to introduce 
a 12-month cooling-of period after the LTA purchase.41 The 
government was aware of the intense pressure DC customers 
are under when they make their LTA purchase. 
The idea is that the cooling-of period would give retirees 
the chance to review and change what might have been a 
poorly-informed decision. It would have the additional benefit of 
putting insurance companies and distributors on notice, since 
they would sufer if there were a mass exodus of customers in 
the first 12-months due to poor pricing and/or sales processes. 
Moreover, data on redemptions and repurchases would be 
very valuable for the industry and the regulators, as it would be 
possible to identify insurance companies that sell inappropriate 
products at uncompetitive rates and distributors that operate 
poor sales practices.
Nevertheless there are cost implications. Insurance 
companies would have to hold the premium in low-interest 
liquid assets for a year in case annuitants asked for their money 
back at the end of the cooling of period. Further, the annuity 
would have to be re-priced at the end of the year to reflect 
prevailing interest rates and any revised mortality assumptions. 
If insurance companies were required to honour the quote 
made a year earlier, then this would have to be suficiently 
low to account for the risks that the insurance companies are 
carrying in the intervening period. 
Following the 2014 Budget, this proposal should no longer 
be necessary at the point of retirement, particularly if scheme 
drawdown becomes the norm, since this would provide a 
breathing space pre- rather than post-LTA purchase. This would 
avoid the introduction of a potentially complex and costly 
process of LTA review, rebate and repurchase that the cooling-
of period would entail, and the equally likely danger of a ‘churn’ 
mentality developing among insurers and distributors, since 
they now have an incentive to bid for these clients during the 
cooling of period. 
Nevertheless, it still might be relevant for two reasons. 
First, the purchase of annuities for health/lifestyle reasons 
at the point of retirement might be inappropriate where 
the enhancements are small. It will be important to avoid 
annuitisation under the new regime, where the rationale 
is based on the availability of an enhancement without 
considering its merits relative to drawdown. Second, it will still 
be important when DC retirees purchase a LTA in later life, since 
at this point it will be essential to achieve the optimal rate in 
the open market, based on deep underwriting of medical and 
lifestyle factors.
3.3.5 Switchable Annuities
This idea appears to be the least attractive and most 
impractical of the government’s pre-2014 Budget proposals for 
insurance companies [BBC 2014]. In early 2014, the DWP said 
it was considering changing the rules for LTAs to allow people 
to switch providers post-purchase. The proposal was met with 
fierce criticism on the part of insurance companies, which 
argued that the cost of this flexibility would reduce LTA rates by 
about 25%. We were not able to verify this figure, but the point 
about increased costs is valid. 
Insurance companies are buy-and-hold investors of the 
bonds used to make the LTA payments. They buy bonds with 
diferent maturities and make the annuity payments from 
the coupons and redemption payments on these bonds. The 
cash inflows from the bonds need to be received before the 
LTA payments are made in order to minimise the insurance 
companies’ holdings of cash reserves. 
LTA payments typically are made monthly, but the coupon 
payments on the bonds are only received semi-annually. The 
required cash-flow matching exercise is complex and needs to 
be done in the most cost-efective way. Once the bonds are in 
place, they are held until they mature and then the redemption 
proceeds are used to buy new bonds at prevailing rates which 
might be higher or lower than the insurance company had 
initially predicted. This is known as reinvestment risk and 
insurance companies need to hold reserves to cover the 
possibility that interest rates are lower and therefore that the 
new bonds are more expensive than predicted. 
Insurance companies already have to accommodate in 
their reserves the possibility of adverse mortality experience, 
i.e., that realised mortality rates turn out to be lower (annuitants 
live longer) than predicted. If, in addition to this, insurance 
companies have to allow for the possibility that annuitants can 
sell back their annuities at any time, then this would certainly 
increase costs. Insurance companies would have to hold 
40This is similar to the smoothing principle of a with-profits annuity. 41Telegraph, 17 april 2014.
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Accumulation: In DC schemes and plans, this refers to the 
period during which pension contributions are invested, at the 
end of which the accumulated fund is used to provide a lifetime 
income (known as the decumulation stage), although this may 
change after the 2014 Budget.
Active member discount (AMD): A lower annual management 
charge that applies to active members of a scheme (i.e., 
employees), which is increased when they leave employment. 
See deferred member penalty.
Advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA): A type of deferred 
annuity where payments begin when the annuitant is in the very 
late stage of retirement.
Advice: A confusing subject and terminology for consumers. 
The FCA regulates advice in relation to the sales of financial 
services products. ‘Full’ or ‘regulated’ advice is where the adviser 
takes responsibility for the recommendation and charges a fee 
(with any commission built in to the product pricing rebated). 
This type of advice confers access to the FOS in cases of 
mis-selling. ‘Non-advice’ – also known as ‘guided advice’ – is 
commission-based and the adviser is not responsible for the 
‘sale’ because this type of selling is classed as execution-only, 
i.e., the customer is responsible for the purchase. A more simple 
form of guidance, such as that provided by MAS and TPAS, helps 
DC customers to understand their options, the terminology, and 
the factors they might wish to take into account. Typically this 
is delivered via a website and/or by phone and it is not linked 
to a sales process. The 2014 Budget announced plans to make 
available a form of impartial face-to-face guidance for all DC 
retirees, but the details were not known at the time of writing.
Annual management charge (AMC): The annual 
management charge, deducted from member funds during 
accumulation, covers disclosed investment costs and 
administration, among other items. The AMC is regarded as an 
incomplete disclosure measure. The total expense ratio is more 
comprehensive, but is still not complete, as is the IMA’s ‘ongoing 
charges’. There is growing pressure on providers to disclose all 
product and fund costs, including transaction costs and the cost 
of sub-funds.
Annuitant: The purchaser of an annuity.
Annuity: The lifetime annuity (LTA) is the most common type 
of annuity purchased with a defined contribution (DC) pot. 
This is an insurance policy that guarantees an income for life in 
return for the DC pension fund (the insurance premium). Other 
types of annuity include:
Glossary of terms 
  Advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA): Also known as 
longevity insurance, this  type of annuity is not currently sold 
in the UK. The ALDA begins to pay out at a date in very late 
retirement, e.g., age 85, if the member survives to that age.
  Compulsory purchase annuity (CPA): The name given to 
an annuity purchased with the proceeds of a DC pension fund 
prior to April 6, 2011. Compulsory annuitisation ended in the UK 
on this date. Before then, assets had to be annuitised by age 75 
at the latest. At present, most DC customers still buy an annuity 
at some point, but this is likely to change in April 2015 if the 2014 
Budget proposals become law, at which point there will be no 
requirement to buy an annuity with the DC pension fund. 
  Enhanced and lifestyle annuity: An individually 
underwritten LTA where life-shortening medical and lifestyle 
factors are assessed and the annuity rate increased accordingly.
  Fixed-term annuity (FTA): This provides an income, 
usually linked to annuity rates, for up to five years, after which 
the insurance company returns a percentage of the fund.
  Immediate needs annuity: A specialist product that 
is purchased at the point of entry to a care home. It pays a 
guaranteed income for life to help cover the cost of care fees in 
exchange for a one-of lump-sum premium.
  Indexed and escalating annuity: The annuity rate 
increases each year. The rate of increase can be linked to 
the rate of inflation (indexed) or it can be fixed, e.g. 3% p.a. 
(escalating).
  Investment-backed (or investment-linked) annuity 
(IBA): The DC pot (premium) is invested in a fund of growth 
assets, the performance of which determines the annuity 
income.  
  Level annuity: This pays a fixed annual income for life; it 
does not increase with inflation.
  Phased annuity purchase (phased retirement): The DC 
pot – including the tax-free lump sum – is segmented. Each year 
one or more segments are used to buy an annuity. The tax-free 
cash attached to the segments is used to provide the income in 
the early years and to boost it in the later years. 
  Purchased life annuity (PLA): A voluntary annuity 
purchased with non-pension assets. The taxation of the PLA is 
diferent from the CPA. A part of the annuity is regarded as a 
return of capital to the annuitant with a PLA and hence is not 
taxable. The rest is taxable as income, but non-taxpayers can 
reclaim the 20% tax automatically deducted at source on PLA 
income.44
Annuity rate: The income the insurance company guarantees 
to pay per month or per annum in return for the lump sum  
(the premium). It can also be expressed as a percentage yield.
suficient liquid reserves to avoid the possibility of having to sell 
some of the bonds needed to make payments to the remaining 
annuitants.  It would be like an airline planning to fly non-stop 
from London to Sydney, but then being required to allow every 
passenger to get of the plane at any airport between London 
and Sydney and claim a partial refund on their ticket.
To summarise, while it might be argued that the facility 
to surrender annuities would stimulate competition and 
prompt insurance companies to ofer higher rates initially, the 
calculation of the ‘surrender value’ of an annuity would prove 
complex and potentially allow the insurer to extract additional 
profit.  
3.3.6 ‘State annuities’
On 2 April 2014 the government confirmed the details for its 
plan to allow pensioners and those who reach pension age 
before 6 April 2016 to top-up their state pension by up to £25 
per week.42 The ofer, which will be available for 18 months 
starting in October 2015, will enable people to get a higher 
inflation-proofed state pension by making Class 3A Voluntary 
National Insurance contributions. The cost is based on age and 
takes account of average life expectancy. For a 65-year-old an 
extra £1 of For a 65-year-old an extra £1 of weekly pension will 
cost £890; for a 75-year-old, £1 per week will cost £674.  
A calculator is available online.43
This is an interesting move on the government’s part, as, in 
efect, it represents a short-term entry into the retail annuity 
market.  The government’s pricing compares very favourably 
with an annuity bought on the open market.
42https://www.gov.uk/government/news/state-pension-top-ups-pensions-can-be-increased-by-up-to-25-a-week 43www.gov.uk/state-pension-topup 44See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/life-annuity-income.htm
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Anticipated bonus rate (ABR): In a with-profits investment-
backed annuity (see annuity), it is possible to adjust the 
annual income by making assumptions about the next annual 
return or bonus.
Auto-enrolment: The new system of pension scheme 
provision for all employers, which mainly afects the private 
sector and which is being phased in between October 2012 and 
2018. 
Employers and qualifying workers (those aged between  
22 and the state pension age, earning at least £10,000 in 2014 
– 2015) must make minimum contributions based on band 
earnings, but the latter have the right to opt out. Qualifying 
auto-enrolment schemes do not have to be DC but, in practice, 
the majority will be so. They must ofer a default fund for 
members who do not wish to make their own investment 
decisions.
Bundled scheme: A DC scheme where the provider is 
responsible for both the asset management and administration 
functions and might also be an annuity provider ofering 
rates to members (internal or rollover sales). An alternative 
description to ‘bundled’ is ‘vertical integration’.
Capped drawdown: See income drawdown
Cash-equivalent transfer value (CETV): The value of the 
benefits accrued in a defined benefit scheme when the 
member changes jobs and moves their benefits to another 
eligible scheme – often defined contribution – to take 
advantage of more flexible income options. It is calculated as 
the capital sum which, if invested appropriately, is expected to 
provide the member’s DB scheme benefits as they fall due.
Collective DC: see Defined ambition
Commission: This has various meanings, but in the context of 
annuities, it refers to the sales commission paid by insurance 
companies to advisers (also known as brokers) that sell on a 
guided basis (also known as ‘non-advice’ and execution-only), 
where the customer receives guidance but is responsible for 
making the purchase decision. Commission is calculated as a 
percentage of the fund. Rates for annuities range from about 
1.5% to 3.5%, although some brokers receive a much higher rate, 
e.g. 5-6%. Income drawdown must be sold under regulated 
advice and on a fee basis. See Retail Distribution Review.
Contract-based DC scheme: Broadly speaking, DC schemes 
can be established under contract or trust law. In a contract-
based scheme, the contract is between the member and the 
provider, for example a life ofice. Contract-based DC scheme 
is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
More than one employer can use a contract-based scheme  
(multi-employer DC scheme). See also trust-based DC.
Decumulation: The process whereby the DC fund built up 
during the accumulation stage is converted into a lifetime 
income in retirement. Typically, this involves the purchase of 
a lifetime annuity, but the member might also draw directly 
from the fund (income drawdown). This market will change 
radically if the 2014 Budget proposals become law in April 2015.
Deep underwriting: In pricing an enhanced annuity, this 
is where the insurance company takes into account a full 
evaluation of all the factors that might afect how long an 
annuitant lives. See light underwriting.
Default fund: In a DC scheme, this is the multi-asset fund 
designated to receive the contributions of members who do 
not make an investment choice. Under auto-enrolment, an 
estimated 90-97% of members will rely on this fund.
Deferred member: The description applied to members of 
DC schemes who leave the sponsoring employer’s company. In 
a trust-based scheme, membership continues and so former 
employees continue to be the responsibility of the scheme 
trustees. In a contract-based scheme, the contract frequently 
is reclassified as an individual personal pension, so the 
individual is no longer a member of the previous employer’s 
scheme.
Deferred member penalty: When a member leaves a 
contract-based DC scheme, some insurance companies 
impose a higher annual management charge on their 
pension plan. This practice, which the government has 
said it will ban, applies where ‘active’ members (employees) 
benefit from an active member discount, i.e., a lower annual 
management charge.
Defined ambition (DA): A DWP initiative that aims to 
encourage employers to provide DC schemes that ofer more 
predictable outcomes, for example, via some form of return 
guarantee or risk-sharing mechanism between diferent 
cohorts of members. One option is collective DC (CDC). Here 
the contributions of the employer and employees would be 
fixed and the risk remains with the members, as per the current 
system. The key diference is that risk is shared collectively 
between the members (via intergenerational transfers) and 
retirement benefits are adjusted pre- and post-retirement 
according to the fund’s performance (comparing the funding 
level relative to benefits promised). Benefits might rise, 
therefore, but they also might fall, although the arrangement 
would be designed to minimise fluctuations. At retirement, the 
member would receive the pension income directly from the 
scheme fund.
Defined benefit (DB): Members’ pensions are linked to salary 
(e.g., final salary or now more commonly earnings averaged 
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over the period of membership). The sponsoring employer is 
ultimately responsible for meeting the liability if the scheme is 
underfunded. See defined contribution. 
Defined contribution (DC): In DC, the member’s pension is based 
on a range of factors, the main ones being the level of contributions 
invested, the charges deducted, and investment returns. The fund 
is used at retirement to generate a lifetime income, usually in the 
form of an annuity (although this might change following the 2014 
Budget). Therefore the investment and longevity risks, among 
others, fall solely on the individual members.
Diversified growth fund (DGF): A fund that aims to increase 
the return and/or reduce risk through investing in a wide range 
of asset classes, often including alternative asset classes. 
Duration: This measures the sensitivity of the price of an 
annuity or the price of a bond to changes in interest rates. It 
also measures the average time in years that your money is 
invested in an annuity or bond, or equivalently the time it takes 
to get half your investment back in terms of annuity or bond 
payments. If the duration of an annuity or bond is, say, 11 (years), 
then a 1% increase in interest rates will reduce the price of an 
annuity or bond by 11%.
Enhanced annuity: See annuity.
Escalating and indexed annuity: See  annuity.
Execution-only: See advice.
Fixed-term annuity: See  annuity.
Flexible drawdown: See income drawdown.
Gilt: The common name for a UK government bond.
Glide path: In a default fund, members’ funds are transitioned 
over a period of years before retirement (e.g. 10-15) from higher 
risk growth assets into lower risk bonds and cash in order to 
protect members from extreme market shocks just prior to 
decumulation and the purchase of an annuity.
Group personal pension scheme (GPPS): A contract-based 
workplace pension scheme. In efect, this is a grouping of 
individual personal pension plans, but with pricing to reflect 
the group nature of the arrangement.
Guarantee: With a lifetime annuity, it is possible to buy an 
additional insurance feature that ensures the annuity income 
will be paid for at least the period of the guarantee, e.g. five or 
ten years. If the annuitant dies before the end of the guarantee 
period, the income is paid to the estate.
Guaranteed annuity rate (GAR): The annuity rate is fixed at 
the time the member joins the DC pension scheme or plan, 
rather than at the time the lifetime annuity is purchased.  
GARs used to be ofered by many insurance companies 
through their with-profits pensions policies, but when interest 
rates fell, the guarantees increased so much in value that they 
led to financial dificulties, particularly in the case of Equitable 
Life. 
Guidance and guided advice: See advice 
Immediate vesting: This is where an individual aged 55 or 
over makes a lump sum contribution to a personal pension 
plan, secures tax relief, then immediately takes 25% of the fund 
as tax-free cash and takes the rest as an annuity or, under the 
proposed April 2015 rules, as taxable income. It is possible the 
government may restrict this strategy.
Income drawdown: At retirement, instead of purchasing an 
annuity, the individual draws a regular income directly from 
the fund. At present there are two types of drawdown. Under 
capped drawdown, following a 2014 Budget change, the 
maximum amount that can be drawn per annum is 150% of the 
annuity rate set by the Government Actuary’s Department (up 
from 120%). Under flexible drawdown, any amount can be 
drawn, provided the individual has £12,000 in secure pension 
from other sources (down from £20,000). From April 2015, 
the government plans to abolish all restrictions on the annual 
income and there will be no age restrictions. 
 
Individual Savings Account (ISA): A tax-favoured savings 
and investment account whereby contributions are made from 
taxed income, but the investments are free from income tax 
and capital gains tax and the emerging pot is tax free. There are 
no restrictions on withdrawals and the 2014 Budget increased 
the annual allowance to £15,000.
Investment-backed annuity: See annuity
Load factor: A measure of the extent to which the money’s 
worth will be less than 100% due to the administrative and 
regulatory costs and normal profits incurred by the annuity 
provider.
Light underwriting: In pricing an enhanced annuity, this is 
where the insurance company takes into account only limited 
details of the factors that might afect how long an annuitant 
lives, e.g., 10 questions on major lifestyle and medical factors. 
See deep underwriting.
Lifestyle/lifecycle: Another term to describe the glide path 
of a default fund, which aims to de-risk members’ funds in the 
run up to retirement. The asset-class switching decisions are 
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made by the scheme fiduciaries and their advisers. From the 
member’s perspective their pot appears to be in a single fund, 
but in reality the default fund comprises several risk-graded 
funds. Typically, a higher-risk range of sub-funds are used for 
the main growth phase and then during the de-risking phase, 
the member’s assets are switched systematically into lower risk 
sub-funds over the period of the glide path. See target date 
fund.
Lifetime annuity (LTA): See annuity.
Limited price indexation (LPI):  LPI is the retail price index 
(RPI) capped at a certain rate, e.g., 2.5% or 5%. 
Longevity: A general term for expressing how long someone 
will live, more formally expressed in terms of life expectancy. 
For example, the life expectancy of a 65-year old male might be 
22 years which means he is expected to live until age 87. See 
mortality rate. 
Long term care (LTC): As a generic term, this refers to 
residency of a care home (residential/nursing) in later 
retirement. The government is concerned about the cost of 
LTC, which is funded by local authorities once the individual’s 
assets fall below a certain level, and is looking for ways for 
people to fund the bills, either with their DC pot or with LTC 
insurance, which can be taken out at the point of entry into a 
care home (known as an ‘immediate needs’ annuity). 
Marginal tax rate: This can be a surprisingly complicated 
point, but in relation to the trivial commutation rules and 
proposed income drawdown rules from April 2015, this 
denotes the individual’s top rate of income tax, which will be 
deducted from a pension lump sum drawn in addition to the 
tax-free allowance). 
Master trust: A trust-based DC workplace pension scheme 
that can accommodate multiple non-related employers. The 
trustee board might be wholly independent of the scheme 
provider or might include provider representation.
Money’s worth: The expected present discounted value of the 
future annuity payments divided by the actual price paid. The 
closer money’s worth is to 100%, the better the value for money 
received by the annuitant. See load factor.
Mortality assumptions: The assumptions about future 
mortality rates made by an annuity provider in determining 
the price of an annuity.
Mortality bufer: The extra margin built into the mortality 
assumptions used by an annuity provider in determining 
the price of an annuity to allow for the possibility that future 
mortality rates are lower than projected.
Mortality rate: The percentage of a group of people who will 
die at a certain age.  For example, the mortality rate for 65-year 
old males might be 0.9% which means that 0.9% of 65-year old 
males are expected to die before they reach 66.
Mortality drag (or mortality premium): The mortality 
drag at age x is equal to qx/(1 – qx) where qx is the proportion 
of annuitants aged x who die before their next birthday. The 
mortality drag measures the additional return an annuity ofers 
compared with a risk-free asset such as government bonds 
(gilts). It increases with age, which is why it can make sense 
to delay the purchase of an annuity as long as possible. The 
mortality drag is also a measure of the cross-subsidy from 
those annuitants who die before their life expectancy to those 
who live beyond their life expectancy. 
Mortality table: Underwriters use a mortality table to predict 
how long an annuitant might live in order to set the annuity 
rate. Diferent mortality tables will be used for diferent types of 
annuitant.
Multi-employer DC scheme: See contract-based DC and 
trust-based DC.
Multi-trust DC scheme: See trust-based DC.
Non-advice: See advice.
Open market option (OMO): The technical definition of 
‘exercising the OMO’, introduced in 1975, is to buy an annuity 
from an insurance company that is not the provider of the 
pension plan. A better definition is to use an annuity adviser 
or website facility to broke the whole of the market, taking 
into consideration timing, lifestyle/medical features, product 
features, etc.
Payback period: The number of years it takes for the 
insurance company to return the full premium or original 
capital in the case of a lifetime annuity.
Pension liberation: This is classed by the regulators as a scam 
or fraud, depending on the circumstances. The process involves 
the transfer of a pension fund to an arrangement that facilitates 
access before age 55 (the legal age at which access is permitted, 
apart from in rare cases, e.g., terminal illness). The tax charges 
and fees, which individuals might not understand, are notoriously 
high. See pension unlocking, which is quite diferent.
Pension unlocking: This is where a DC investor takes their 
25% tax-free lump sum early – often at age 55 (the legal 
minimum). It is perfectly legal, but unscrupulous salespeople 
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target DC customers, making it look like a little-known 
opportunity, and charge a high fee. In most cases, people buy 
their annuity at the same time, securing a very low rate due to 
their age. Unlocking is not the same as pension liberation.
Personal pension plan (PPP): An individual (retail)  
DC pension plan, introduced in 1988.
Phased annuity purchase (phased retirement):  
See annuity.
Platform: With reference to DC schemes, this is the life ofice’s 
‘engine’, which manages the day-to-day running of a range of 
functions including investment management, administration 
(e.g., of contributions), compliance, integration with employers’ 
pensions and payroll systems, and member communication 
and documentation. There might also be (and frequently are) 
third party investment managers on the platform to which DC 
customers have access in addition to the provider’s own funds.
Purchased life annuity (PLA): See annuity.
Quantitative easing (QE): A type of monetary policy used 
to stimulate the economy when short-term interest rates have 
become so low that standard monetary policy is no longer 
efective. The central bank buys long-term bonds in the market 
which lowers their yields and increases the monetary base This, 
in turn, increases private-sector investment and consumption 
expenditure, but the impact on annuity rates is negative.
Retail Distribution Review (RDR): The RDR came into efect 
on 1 January 2013. It banned adviser commission for new sales 
of regulated investment products, including pension schemes 
and plans. From this date onwards, all advice relating to the sale 
of new investment products must be fee-based. However, since 
most annuities are sold on a non-advice or guided advice basis, 
the commission system still operates. See advice.
Scheme (institutional) drawdown: This is an emerging 
solution to specific problems within the DC decumulation 
market and would most likely be ofered by trustees of a 
workplace auto-enrolment scheme. The idea is to provide 
a breathing space between the point of retirement and the 
annuity purchase, or, where suitable, to provide an alternative 
to an annuity for an extended period of retirement. The fund 
would pay an income and might be flexible and liquid, so that 
it could be used for just a few months or up to age 75, for 
example. As in the accumulation phase, the member would pay 
an annual member charge or total expense ratio.
Stakeholder pension scheme: Introduced in 2001, 
stakeholder schemes are like group personal pension 
schemes, but must meet certain requirements in relation to 
accessibility, fair terms and conditions. Requirements include  
a single annual management charge and no exit penalties.
Target date fund (TDF): An investment strategy designed for 
DC default funds, whereby the scheme establishes a range of 
TDFs, each with its own glide path. This might involve a TDF for 
each possible retirement date, or there might be a single TDF 
for members who plan (or are expected) to retire within a given 
five-year window. See lifestyle.
Total expense ratio (TER): The TER is a more comprehensive 
measure of the DC scheme member’s total annual cost than 
the annual management charge (AMC), but is still far from 
complete. It includes the AMC and fees for a range of services 
including legal, administration, audit, marketing, directors, and 
regulatory costs. There is growing pressure on schemes to 
reveal all fund costs, including transaction costs and the cost  
of sub-funds.
Trivial commutation: From 27 March 2014, where the total 
pensions are worth £30,000 (previously £18,000) or less, the 
whole amount can be taken as cash; 25% tax-free and the 
rest taxed at the marginal rate of income tax.  Up to three 
small pension pots each up to £10,000 can be taken as cash, 
even where total pension savings are worth more than the 
£30,000 limit (taxed as per above – previously the maximum 
was two pots worth up to £2000 each).  From April 2015, the 
government plans to remove all restrictions on how much of 
the fund can be taken as cash (subject to income tax, after  
the first tax-free 25%).
Trust-based DC: Schemes set up under trust law where 
the trustees are the legal owners of the assets on behalf of 
members and have a fiduciary duty to act in members’ best 
interests. These schemes are regulated by The Pensions 
Regulator (TPR). Multi-trust schemes can accept multiple 
employers that are not connected (multi-employer DC scheme).
With-profits: These insurance company mixed-asset funds 
were heavily sold until the mid-1990s, but since then have been 
largely in decline. The fund invests in a range of asset classes, 
for example, bonds, property and equities. The declared annual 
bonus is set to provide a smoothed – generally growing – 
income from the fund, unlike the income from a unit-linked fund 
which is much more volatile since the value of the units directly 
reflects the value of the underlying fund. The smoothing 
mechanism requires the holding of a reserve, with the objective 
of delivering a fairly stable income even during periods where 
the markets are volatile and falling. Many companies that sold 
with profits pension plans ofered a guaranteed annuity rate.
Yield curve: Plot of the yields on bonds of diferent terms 
to maturity, which insurance companies that sell annuities 
purchase to support the guaranteed lifetime incomes they pay 
to annuitants.
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ABI  Association of British Insurers
ABR  Anticipated bonus rate
AMC  Annual management charge
AUM  Assets under management
CDC Collective Defined Contribution
CETV Cash-equivalent transfer value
CPI   Consumer Price Index
DA  Defined Ambition
DB  Defined Benefit
DC  Defined Contribution
DGF  Diversified growth fund
DWP  Department for Work and Pensions
FCA  Financial Conduct Authority
FOS Financial Ombudsman Scheme
FSCP Financial Services Consumer Panel
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme
FTA Fixed-term annuity
GAD Government Actuary’s Department
GAR Guaranteed annuity rate
GPP  Group Personal Pension
GSP  Group Stakeholder Plan
HMT HM Treasury
IBA Investment-backed annuity
ISA Individual Savings Account
LTA Lifetime annuity
LTC Long term care
MAS Money Advice Service
NIC   National Insurance Contributions
OFT  Ofice of Fair Trading
ONS  Ofice for National Statistics
PLA Purchased life annuity
PPP  Personal Pension Plan
PRA  Prudential Regulation Authority
QE Quantitative easing
RDR  Retail Distribution Review
TDF Target date fund
TER  Total expense Ratio
TPAS The Pensions Advisory Service
TPR  The Pensions Regulator
VfM Value for money
WPA With-profits annuity
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The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
  to undertake high quality research in all fields related to 
pensions
  to communicate the results of that research to the academic 
and practitioner communities
  to establish an international network of pensions researchers 
from a variety of disciplines
  to provide expert independent advice to the pensions 
industry and government
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time 
disciplines such as economics, finance, insurance and actuarial 
science through to accounting, corporate governance, law and 
regulation have been brought together in order to enhance 
strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the 
first and only UK academic research centre focused entirely 
on pensions, the Pensions Institute unites some of the world’s 
leading experts in these fields in order to ofer an integrated 
approach to solving the complex problems that arise in this field.
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range 
of fields, including:
  Pension microeconomics
   The economics of individual and corporate pension  
 planning, long-term savings and retirement decisions
  Pension fund management and performance
   The investment management and investment   
 performance of occupational and personal pension schemes
  Pension funding and valuations
   The actuarial and insurance issues related to   
 pension schemes, including risk management, asset liability  
 management, funding, scheme design, annuities and   
 guarantees
  Pension law and regulation
   The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund  
 management
  Pension accounting, taxation and administration
   The operational aspects of running pension schemes
  Marketing
   The practice and ethics of selling group and individual  
 pension products
  Macroeconomics of pensions
   The implications of aggregate pension savings and   
 the impact of the size and maturity of pension funds on  
 other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, public and  
 international sectors)
  Public policy
   Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision  
 and other employee benefits in the light of factors such  
 as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and the   
 demographic developments in Europe and other countries
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include 
views on policy but the Pensions Institute itself takes no 
institutional policy positions. For more details, 
see http://www.pensions-institute.org 
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